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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the phenomenon of user-generated
environmental change. User-generated environmental change
refers to those activities in which the users shape the
parts or pieces of their physical environments. Specifically
examined is the motivations of the users in this particular
activity; what things or situations influence or engender
the users to act upon their environments?
The method for the study is primarily through library
research into various cases of user-generated environmental
changes as well as into literature concerning behavior in
the physical environment.
Particular social psychological phenomena are defined
as conducive to the user's behavior; namely, the concepts of
alienation and anomie, and of identity. The relationships
between these concepts and this activity are examined both
through a careful review of the concepts and through analyses
of the documentations of user-generated environmental changes.
Through this theoretical study a hypothesis is proposed:
Some user-generated environmental changes occur as a result
of the user being confronted with an alienating or an anomic
condition.
Another question is then posed concerning what this
proposition might imply for the practice of environmental
design. It is argued that the practice must be directed at
solving the cause rather than the consequence of the problem
(of alienation). Also suggested is the need for critical
examinations of the prescriptions in currency or in develop-
ment in the field of environmental design so as to better
understand the issues involved.
Thesis Supervisors:
William A. Southworth
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Lecturer in Architecture
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5CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION: USER-GENERATED ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE
1. General Background
The recent emphasis in the field of environmental
design that, as a profession, it must be responsive to
people (i.e., users) and its practice must be socially
responsible may be attributed in part to the social and
political awareness generated in the 1960's. The effort
to design the physical environment more accommodating to
the needs, aspirations, and life patterns of the users
stimulated developments of studies of the ways in which
people behave in the physical environment. In this way
the environmental designers and the social scientists
discovered each other. Together, they developed an inter-
disciplinary field of environmental studies --more specifi-
cally, environmental psychology-sociology-- which in many
design schools today is recognized as one of the important
subjects for education of the prospective designers.
Almost in parallel to the vigorous empirical research
in environmental studies and the related areas, the environ-
6mental designers engage themselves in developing various
design methods, environmental programming techniques,
computer applications to handle the sets of complex infor-
mation pertaining to the users, and technological innova-
tions of building systems that can be readily handled and
manipulated by the users as their needs evolve and change
over time.
Indeed, any designer who is concerned with creating
a non-oppressive, democratic, and humane environment would
spend his energy trying to understand more about and learn
from the people who actually use and must live in (or live
with?) the physical environment he designs. But at the
same time, there is a dilemma that is quite problematic to
the designer: While it takes time to accumulate and develop
systematic knowledge in environmental design, the designer
is demanded to plan or prescribe solutions for the immedi-
ate problems. We need more and better housing that 'works,'
but we do not know how to design such housing. Yet, we do
need housing, so we design housing without much guarantee
the it will 'work.' We need more schools, new communities,
new cities..... How does one resolve this dilemma?
/questions on
Developed along with the concern for responsivity is7
the practice of environmental design itself, which led to
a search for alternative models of the professional-layman
relationship. Some came to emphasize participation of the
7users. There developed a notion that the designer is to
provide 'situations' through design of the physical environ-
ment wherein the users can 'take over' the process in
shaping the environment by directly acting upon it. This
idea of pragmatic participation of the users in the process
of environmental development and of the designer as a pro-
vider of 'frameworks' (i.e., 'situations' in a more physical
term) has been quite attractive to the author as an alter-
native mode of practice and for its potentiality for demo-
cratization of the process --who manages and rules the
physical environment. Apparently, I am not the only one
nor the first (nor perhaps the last) in this line of thought.
This idea is manifested, for instance, in the technological
development of buildings that can be easily manipulated
by the users as they inhabit them.* However, the under-
lying assumptions of this (what appears to be) pragmatic
resolution of the dilemma need to be examined.
The idea seems to assume, first, the nature -of respon-
sive environment; i.e., implicit in the idea appears to be
that the less the designer provides, the more responsive
the environment. Second, and more specifically, the idea
implies that the user best knows what he needs and desires.
Third, the user 'should' participate in the process of
environmental development. Fourth, the user 'can' partici-
* The footnotes and references for this chapter are found
in page 91,
8pate in the process. And fifth, the idea does partially
reject the traditional paternalistic model of the profes-
sional-layman relationship, in which (the paternalistic
model) the designer shapes the user's physical environment
even to the extent of selecting furnitures, what paintings
or sculptures to be put at certain places, etc., and expects
little from the user. It is a partial rejection of this
paternalistic model in that the professional in this model
still acts as a provider --the ideal model might be the
user's total control of the process, i.e., deprofessionali-
zation of environmental design. The four assumptions or
implications (second through fifth) related back to the
first broad assumption in the nature of responsive environ-
ment. That is, these four assumptions compose a condition
conducive to making our environment responsive.
While this concept of 'user take-over' and of designing
and planning for and with the users in the process of envi-
ronmental development are attractive, these modes of prac-
tice are not yet common. However, as suggested earlier,
the current emphiasis indicates a direction toward wider
user-involvement and 'self-help' technology in recognition
of the present, still undeveloped, "low grounding of design
2
rationale" toward making of responsive environment. Yet,
the assumptions inherent in this particular emphasis, which
are discussed above, demand a more careful examination of
9this practice. For instance, with regard to the role of
the designer in this effort, it is necessary to acknowledge
that the profession of environmental design will continue
to exist within the present context.3 This in turn implies
that there are certain limitations in user-involvemeat as
such in the process of environmental development. On the
other hand, this trend can be seen as a value imposition
of the designer onto the user; it is another form of pater-
nalism. That is, although the designer feels that the user
'should' and 'can' participate, the user may not feel the
same way and feel forced into something which they do not
wish to get involved at all.
Thus, all this implies that although the user-involve-
ment idea is good and well in intention, the basis for this
practice requires a lot more substantial knowledge of the
user's ability, capacity, and motivation for involvement
in the environmental development process. (I am not here
referring to the decision-making process of the political
and negotiative nature, but more specifically to the process
of direct user participation in the physical shaping of the
environment.) Such knowledge is necessary in order to
achieve a delicate balance in the planning, design, and take-
over process; for it could provide some clues on how much
or to what extent the professional ought to contribute in
the process of design toward realization of truly responsive
10
environment.
2. Purpose of the Thesis
A need for a careful examination of the assumptions to
better understand the nature and the meaning of responsive
environment reminds us, however, of the dilemma which I
have briefly discussed earlier. The dilemma, it seems to
me, is really the heart of the problem that confronts the
field of environmental design. The problem is that the
environmental designer as an active, professional member of
society must and is expected to act, and there is no solid
theoretical or philosophical basis for practice. Of course,
one hears of so-called "design theories," but they are most
often narrow and precludes many factors and possibilties.4
For example, the assumption of the user-involvement, as
discussed earlier, is that the user 'can' participate. But
this assumption can be easily challenged on the ground, in
the case of a commercial building design or a office build-
ing design, that some users have less say than other users.
Can the janitor, both socially or politically and psycho-
logically, participate in the process of environmental de-
velopment of the office building with the president of the
company? Does the so-called "design theory" for making of
responsive environment take this sort of factor into ac"-
11
count? The field of environmEntal design is in need of
some philosophical base which does not preclude, among other
things, that which may be playing a significant role in the
makings and uses of the physical environment, and which
understands its position or role in the social, political,
or ideological processes of society. It needs to sit back
and retreat from the all-too-common manifestation of the
"traditional praxis in pragmatic eclecticism.,,5 The prac-
tice of environmental design, no matter how well intended,
could result in something quite different from the original
intention. The enormity of the problems and issues inherent
in the practice requires extreme caution and a clear world
view (Weltanschauung) before one can begin to prescribe
solutions and act. One needs to have a clear sense and
understanding of the 'problems' or issues before he acts
upon them. Yet, developing a clear world view cannot be
achieved over-night; it might take one his life-time or
more to arrive at any clear, comprehensive view. This
thesis is a part of the process toward that clear view. It
is a retreat from the pressures of prescribing solutions,
and attempts to see what the issue or the problem may be,
For the reasons stated earlier, I shall examine one
aspect of .the 'user take-over' activity, which I shall in
this thesis call 'user-generated environmental change':
motivations of the user in this particular activity; what
12
things or situations influence the user to change the phy-
sical environment the way he does? People do generate
changes in their physical environment, but why do they?
When we know the why's of this phenomenon of user-generated
environmental change, we can then begin to constructively
contribute to making our physical environment truly respon-
sive in dealing with the how's. In this sense this thesis
attempts to critically analyze the assumptions underlying
the current emphasis and the prescription in environmental
design.
In this attempt to understand the motivations or condi-
tions behind this phenomenon of users generating physical
or visual changes in the environment, I have explored the
literature concerning behavior in the physical environment,
especially in the cases of, user-generated environmental
change. In this preliminary research, there have been many
references made to the need for control by the individuals
of parts and pieces of the environment, which (the factor
of control) led me to hypothesize that those users 'do
things' to their physical environment as a result of the
lack of control --alienation; i.e., the concept of alienation
seemed to be involved in, or associated with, user-generated
environmental change as a motivating factor. But I have
also found that there are many meanings associated with this
concept, which necessitated an extensive examination of the
13
concept of alienation. Understanding this phenomenon
becomes crucial and a prior matter in this exploration into
the study of user-generated environmental change.
3. An Attempt at a Definition: Questions
By user-generated environmental change I refer to those
activities in which the users (i.e., laymen vis-a-vis pro-
fessionals) shape their physical environment by themselves.
For instance, people painting the walls, putting up fences,
adding rooms to a house by themselves with their own labor,
etc. There are also what may be considered 'negative' or
'destructive' sorts of user-generated changes such as van-
dalization of places, graffiti on the walls, etc. What is
it that makes people, the users, do these things to the
physical environment? What are their motivations?
One can think of some reasons conducive to the phenome-
non. E.g.: existential needs, the person erects a shelter
because he has to house himself; utilitarian efficiency, the
person enlarges or adds a room to accommodate some or a
large piece of furniture he has gotten; economic, the person
does these things by himself because he cannot financially
afford someone else to do them6; and so on and so forth.
While these reasons for environmental change are quite
important and most definitely taken into consideration in
14
design as a fundamental 'needs,' in this thesis I look for
more obscure and 'hidden' phenomena behind this particular
behavior in the physical environment.
Robert Sommer, who is engaged in raising people's
environmental awareness (which is another subject of empha-
sis in the field of environmental design today), regards
user-generated changes in the physical environment as sig-
nifying or symbolic of a particular psychological phenome-
non; the concept of identity:
Sometimes a design fits so tightly that it leaves
no room for individual or group expression of
identity. Even when there is consultation with
users beforehand, a design may not allow for user
inputs afterwards. This may be appropriate for
a timeless monument which is supposed to express
a given moment, but it is unsuitable for buildings
which are supposed to fit people's needs and
support their activities. Not only must a build-
ing respond to changing circumstances, social as
well as technological; it must also permit people
to express their individual and collective identi-
ties. When we fail to do so, we may see user
inputs in the most elementary sense of direct
environmental action.7
With regard to the kinds of 'negative' changes such as
graffiti, Ronald Gross not only agrees vith Sommer but
encourages it. In exploring the reaction to and the meaning
of the "graffiti epidemic" in New York City today:
The graffiti is an example of an instrument for
the individual to assert his identity : person-
ality and therefore we should not repress it.8
Twoquestions arise from these assertions: What is
identity?; and how is identity developed?
15
Identity may be defined as a sense the person has of his
own self-hood, i.e., his own awareness of who he is and
what he is. There are various theories concerning how the
person acquires a sense of identity. It is elaborated by
some social psychologists in role theory, symbolic inter-
actionism, etc. 9 Briefly, the person acquires his identity
through the social roles (e.g., father, child, teacher,
student, employer, employee, etc.) he plays in his group,
and especially through interaction with others by communica,-
ting with them. To communicate, one uses symbols or lan-
guage common to others with whom he develops his self,
identity. Some environmental psychologists find the use
of the physical environment to this purpose; i.e., people
use the physical environment as a symbolic or communicative
means in developing a sense of identity. People do things
to the physical surroundings to have it reflect, enhance,
or negate their ideas of themselves.
Karl Linn, during the course of his "search for a
humane environment," contends that the users become "alie-
nated from their physical environment if they are unable to
leave their personal imprints on their immediate surround-
ings. Relegating human beings to the role of passive
spectators in their environment threatens their mental
equilibrium, and robs them of the opportunity to assert
their authority, to develop mastery over their places of
16
habitat."11  Linn suggests here a case or a hypothesis that
if the user is unable to assert his identity onto his envi-
ronment, he is alienated; such an environment is alienating
to the users. If that is the case, does the user remain
passive and alienated, or does he break out of the frust-
ration and act upon the physical environment? If so, then
what allows him to take action this time?
In 1967 at L. I. T. a group of architecture students
"spontaneously rebelled against the constraining environ-
ment of their drafting rooms" and erected a series of mez-
zanines.12 These students were not assigned to do this in
their architectural studio studies by any means. It was
generated by them, the users of the environment.' What is
it that engendered this environmental change? The partici-
pants in this activity attribute some factors to the cause:
Aside from it being "triggered by a lack of space"'3 ;
..... common to many...is a general feeling that
the immediate environs and the physical/admini-
strative policies of MIT (indeed many parts of
our great society) are unresponsive to us as
human individuals, moreover are often oppressive,
unreasonably narrow, constricting our actions,
denying our moral right to participate in matters
which affect changes in our environment, truly in
matters which affect the course of our lives.14
One of the participants in yet another and similar activity
which took place in the following year at M. I. T. is in
agreement:
..... it has something to do with personal control
17
of environment, with what is your interest in it
and what goes on in it. 15
These statements by the users who generated changes in the
physical enviornment do support the hypothesis that some of
user-generated environmental changes occur as a result of
the user being confronted with an alienating condition.
These students were alienated from the environment. However,
in their statements there is little suggestion that they
were seeking identity as such with their environment or
with themselves. They suggest something other than identity
in general or the physical environment per se, which is
conducive to aliem tion; namely, their inability to "parti-
cipate in matters which affect" not only their environments
but the course of their lives. They suggest that they are
alienated from not having any control over what goes on in
and around their lives. Is this condition of alienation
the same as that in which the user is unable to act upon
their environment? That is, does alienation result when
one cannot control the matters which affect his environment
and life, which are a necessary precondition for him to
achieve or maintain his sense of identity? Is a significant
part of one's identity achieved when the person has (a sense
of) control over his life? Put another way, is there any
relationship between the concept of alienation and the
concept of identity, as it has been suggested? Further,
18
and more fundamentally, what is alienation? How is alie-
nation engendered? Is there any relation between the phe-
nomenon of alienation and user-generated environmental
change? These are additional questions of concern for the
thesis.
Let me attempt to be a little clearer in summary:
We have discussed the various reasons or conditions condu-
cive to user-generated environmental change, e.g., existen-
tial needs, utilitarian efficiency, economic, etc. We have
also discussed user-generated change as related to a parti-
cular psychological concept of identity; people use or do
things to their physical environment to develop their
sense of identity, but this is only one of many ways or
things that contribute to this personal development. Then,
a notion that the user is alienated when he is unable to
use his environment 'for this psychological purpose has
been presented. Another view that user-generated environ-
mental change occur as a result of not identity per se but
of a need to control was put forth. These last two views
pose a question: Is alienation a part of the identity
problem, or is it something else? This leads us to a task
of carefully examining the phenomenon of alienation. What
is alienation, and how is it caused? What are the condi-
tions conducive to alienation? (The latter is discussed. in
detail in Appendix.) Once we understand this phenomenon
of alienation better, then we need to see .if it relates to the
19
idea of user-generated environmental change, and, if so
how.
In the chapter that follows, Chapter Two, I shall dis-
cuss the experiences of alienation from the individual's
(the user's) point of view. During the course of discussion
on alienation from this social psychological perspective,
attempts to examine the links between user-generated envi-
ronmental change and various experiences of alienation will
be made. Also discussed will be the relationships of alie-
nation to the concept of identity, as this question has
been posed.
In Chapter Three, I shall elaborate on these relation-
ships of alienation and behavior in the physical environment
by systematic analyses of the documentations of user-gene-
rated environmental changes.
- In the last chapter, Chapter Four, the implications of
the findings will be discussed. Specifically, the causes of
alienation will be examined for the reason that
we must get at the causes, rather than consequences, of the
problem if we are committed to making our life and environ-
ment truly responsive and humane.
In the Appendix, various approaches to the cause of
alienation, especially the Marxian analogy and the Durkheim-
ian concept of anomie (or social alienation), are further
discussed in detail. The reader may find it useful to go
20
through this Appendix to better understand the nature of
the problem which shall be discussed in Chapter Four.
21
CHAPTER TWO
THE EXPERIENCE OF ALIENATION: TYPOLOGY
The priority of the study now becomes more of a care-
ful analysis of the phenomenon of alienation. When we
understand the phenomenon well, we can then see if there
are grounds for making causal relationships, if any, between
user-generated environmental change and alienation. We can
also clarify the vague connection which has been suggested
between the concept of identity and t1at of alienation in
relation to the aspects of the physical environment.
What is alienation? Melvin Seeman in his article, "On
the Meaning of Alienation," presents a definite, empirically
"measurable," and organized view of the phenomenon of alie-
nation into five basic modes or types: powerlessness,
meaninglessness, normlessness, isolation, and self-estrange-
ment.* Although there are numerous debates amongst social
philosophers and social scientists concerning if alienation
is an objective (i.e., social) or subjective (i.e., psycho-
logical) phenomenon, in this chapter I shall discuss the
types of alienation, as put forth by Seeman.2
* The footnotes and references for this chapter are found
in page 92.
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1. Powerlessness
This view of alienation as the sense of powerlessness
is perhaps the most dominant when one talks of alienation.
It originated in Marx's concept of man, especially in view
of the worker's condition in capitalist society. (See
Appendix for a detailed discussion.) The worker is powerless
"when he is an object controlled and manipulated by other
persons or by an impersonal system, and when he cannot assert
himself as a subject to change or modify this domination.
Like an object, the powerless persoh reacts rather than acts.
He is directed or dominated, rather than self-directing."3
The sense of powerlessness, according to Seeman's
definition, is the "expectancy or probability held by the
individual that his own behavior cannot determine (or con-
trol) the occurrence of the outcomes, or reinforcements,
he seeks."4 The person feels powerless when he senses
little or no significant ability to control the results he
desires. The M. I. T. students who built mezzanines in their
studios manifested, as it has been stated, their desire to
control their education and the world around them by their
very action of changing their physical environment.
2. Meaninglessness
To continue with the Marxian view of the worker' s condi-
23
tion, for the worker his work seems to be meaningless for
the reason that "bureaucratic structures seem to encourage
feelings of meaninglessness. As division of labor increases
in complexity in large scale organizations, individual roles
may -seem to lack organic connection vrith the whole structure
of roles, and the result is that the employee may lack
understanding of the co-ordinated activity and a sense of
purpose in his work." 5 When the worker needs to mind only
his 'own business' as division of labor increases in comp-
lexity and scale, what results is a decline in the "capacity
to act intelligently in a given situation on the basis of
one's own insight into the interrelations of events."6
Thus this mode of alienation is characterized by a
"low expectancy that satisfactory predictions about future
outcomes of behavior can be made." The person senses
little or no significant "ability to predict behavioral
outcomes"8 when he has no clear understanding of the events
in which he takes part, when he does not know what he should
believe in and why he should behave precisely in some way
and not otherwise. The students at M. I. T. who generated
environmental change do mention their feeling of meaning-
lessness, especially in their education.9 They have found
their course of education, over which they have no control,
to be meaningless and, to gain some meaning and therefore
some sense of control, they have acted upon their physical
24
environment.
3. Anomie/Social Alienation
This derives from Durkheim's description of a social
condition following breakdown in the moral structure of
society. (See Appendix.) Modern sociologists generally
describes this condition as that in which there is no con-
sensus between means and ends in the societal process or
social structure. The social norms "regulating individual
conduct have broken down or are no longer effective as rules
for behavior."10  Anomie is a state of confusion, insecuri-
ty, and normlessness. According to DurkheidlLs account of
social development, change --technological vis-a-vis social
- tends to occur progressively, and as change occurs the
social norms (i.e., the moral structure according to Durkheim)
that hold the social organization together must also change.
When there is a contradiction or conflict between the devel-
opment and social norms or moral rules, the condition of
anomie or normlessness results. Seeman defines this condi-
tion from the individual's point of view as "high expectan-
cy that sociallygapproved behavior are required to achieve
given goals."" That is, as society develops and more
wealth it accumulates, the goals of the individuals in
society also become higher. But the social norms or moral
25
rules that are supposed to regulate behavior are slower in
development or in change than the goals. Thus there results
the condition of anomie in which the individuals must turn
to socially illegal means to attain those goals. We all
at one time or another heard an expression: 'People change
slow.' This is so when we compare it with the accelerating
rate of change of technology and its achievements.
Most of us know, as a result, that in some cases we
have to use illegitimate means to attain certain goals or
ends. One has to have, for example, a 'connection' to get
into a certain social group, social organization, or a
company for a job. Robert K. Merton in his "Social Struc
ture and. Anomie" lists five methods of adapting to the
'demands' of society in the condition of anomie to achieve
those demands and the goals it prescribes: conformity,
innovation, ritualism, retreatism, and rebellion.12 One
often has to conform to whatever means available to achieve
certain ends. If one does not wish to conform, he must
innovate new means to achieve them. In the United States,
one might say, this situation of anomie is so wide-spread
that deviant behavior or the uses of illegitimate means
have in some cases become 'folk knowledge' or commonsense.
(One criminologist recently declared,'in rethinking the
delinquency problem, that because it is society that is sick
radical non-intervention --to cure the problem at the root--.
26
is needed.13) Those who neither conforms nor innovates to
'survive' or 'exist' in such a condition may simply retreat
or isolate themselves. This leads us to another mode of
alienation, which Seeman calls "isolation."
Isolation is alienation of the person from the dominant
aims and values of his society. Some of Merton's adaptation
'mechanism' to the condition of anomie --specifically, inno-
vation, retreatism, and rebellion- may fit into this cate-
gory. The intellectuals and the counter-culture people,
for example, are isolated: The intellectual who detaches
himself from the social values and claims to be 'objective'
and 'value-free'; the person in the counter-culture commune
is isolated and alienated from the dominant social values
and norms. They are apart from and not of society, although
they are in it. The isolated individuals "assign low reward
value to goals or beliefs that are typically highly valued
in the given society."14
Let me elaborate on the thesis which Merton has put
forth here on the five adaptive 'tools' or means to the
condition of anomie. Then, I shall examine the activity of
user-generated environmental change that took place at
M. I. T. to see if there is any relationship between that
particular activity and the concept of anomie.
Merton specifies two important social and cultural
27
elements: cultlrally defined goals, purposes, and interests;
and culturally defined means, regulations, and controls to
achieve or attain those goals. The latter is called "insti-
tutional" means or norms. As it has been stated, when
there is a contradiction, a conflict, or no consensus bet-
ween these two elements the social condition becomes unsta-
ble and there develops a condition of anomie. In this
condition of anomie, some activities originally perceived
as instrumental (however illegitimate by the culturally
defined ethical standard) to achieve the goals are trans-
formed into self-contained activities, That is, these
practices rationalize-themselves; they take on their ovrn
meanings and 'power.' "Lacking further objectives," Merton
asserts, the "original purposes are forgotten and close
adherence to institutionally prescribed conduct becomes
a matter of ritual. Sheer conformity becomes a central
value."1 6 Under an anomic condition, the technically most
effective and practical means to obtain the aspirations, the
goals, becomes "typically preferred to institutionally pre-
scribed conduct."' 7 When this practice becomes wide-spread,
it becomes accepted and valued for its own sake. One of
the accepted means that has its own value in society is
conformity.
Innovation is another culturally accepted means under
this social condition of anomie. Innovation is a response
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which occurs "when the individual has assimilated the
cultural emphasis upon the goal without equally internali-
zing the institutional norms governing ways and means for
its attainment." The hard core radical would probably
see this as a cooptive mechanism of the intrinsically evil,
unworkable social system, because innovation, although it
involves rejection of the culturally defined institutional
means, is accepted by society as a value and supports the
basic beliefs of and in society which is, as they see it,
controlled by a certain group of 'power elites.'19
Ritualism is the case when the individual totally
rejects the cultural values or goals and yet still accepts
the institutional norms. As Merton writes, "it involves
the abandoning or scaling down of the lofty cultural goals
of great pecuniary success and rapid social mobility to the
point where one's aspirations can be satisfied. But though
one rejects the cultural obligation to attempt 'to get
ahead in the world,' though one draws in one's horozons,
one continues to abide almost compulsively by institutional
norms."20
But when one rejects both the cultural goals and the
institutional norms, he totally isolates himself. (Retreat-
ism is the complete opposite of conformity, in the sense
that the latter is in congruence with both the goals and
norms.) Merton describes the process the individual goes
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through to get to this point of retreatism through the
series of "defeats" after having first assimilated both the
cultural goals and norms: "The conflict is resolved by
abandoning both precipitating elements, the goals and means.
The escape is complete, the conflict is eliminated, and the
individual is asocialized."2 1
When a group of individuals get together and create
anew different way of life after having gone through the
process of 'tune in, turn on, and drop out,' we have what
Merton calls "rebellion." We see this phenomenon commonly
today in the counter-culture communes. Rebellion "involves
a genuine transvaluation, where the direct or vicarious
experience of frustration leads to full denunciation of
previously prized values....."122 Merton goes on to distin-
guish rebellion from the Nietzschean term of "ressentiment"
which involves no "genuine change in values," while the
former "condemns the craving (for the fundamental value)
itself." 23
Merton asserts these five modes of adaptation occurs
when "anomie or cultural chaos supervenes." 24 These five
phenomena play structural functions of social system in
which there is little or no co-ordination between the goals
it prescribes and the institutional means to attain them.
Now, was there a condition of anomie involved in engen-
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dering environmental change at M. I. T.? There has been a
suggestion that it was a protest, a kind of rebellion.
The building of the.mezzanines constituted on one
hand a vindicative strike at the institution's
policies, an insult to Establishment architecture
and education, while on the other hand demonstra-
tes our eagerness and ability to work long hours
at our own expense to accomplish tasks which we
feel worthwhile, to help our ailing environs.2 5
Rebellion, as it has been defined, does not apply to the
causation of user-generated environmental change. (At least
from the documentation available, it is questionable whether
the students were motivated with a specific aim "to intro-
duce a social structure in whith the cultural standards of
success would be sharply modified... "26) If it was rebel-
lion the students would have dropped out --they would have
rejected the fundamental value itself associated with the
culture. However, there is a relation to innovation, an-
other one of the five functions o f, -or adaptation modes to, the
condition of anomie. The students seem to have "assimilated
the cultural emphasis" or the basic cultural values tbat are
preached throughout the culture, in the educational institu-
tion, in the architectural profession, etc. --e.g., racial
equality, freedom, etc. What they rejected is a particular
mode of professionalization process (i.e., architectutal
education) and. the practice of Establishment architecture
into which they felt they were being molded. This rejection
of the institutional norms led them to generate- environment-
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al change as a manifestation of their discontent. Parenthe-
tically, after the environmental change took place the
administration bowed to implement certain changes in the
educational structure.27
We have so far discussed three experiencial types of
alienation and the relationships of user-generated environ-
mental change to each of them. Let us now turn to another
type, self-estrangement.
5. Self-estranrement
Self-estrangement is perhaps the most extreme form of
alienation. Karl Marx in his "Bconomic and Philosophic
Manuscripts of 18441 describes this condition:
..... in his work...(the worker) does not affirm
himself but denies himself, does not feel content
but unhappy, does not develop freely his physical
and mental energy but mortifies his body and ruins
his mind. The worker therefore only feels himself
outside his work, and in his work feels outside
himself. He is at home when he is not working,
and when he is working he is not at home. His
labor is therefore not voluntary, but coerced; it
is forced labor. It is therefore not the satis-
faction of a need; it is merely a means to satisfy
needs external to it. Its alien character emerges
clearly in the fact that as soon as no physical or
other expulsion exists, labor is shunned like the
plague. External labor, labor in which man alie-
nates himself, is a labor of self-sacrifice, of
mortification.
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When work engenders self-estrangement, it does not encourage
unique abilities, potentialities, or personality of the
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person. He is not free, not involved with his work, nor
with his own self.
This type of alienation often touches upon the concept
of identity. The relationship of the concept of identity
and alienation has been, in the last chapter, questioned
for its vagueness. In fact, this relationship was one of
the reasons for investigating the phenomenon of alienation.
Identity has been defined as an idea the person has of
himself, of his own self-hood. If, however, the person
becomes aware of a discrepancy between his ideal self and
actual self, he may face an 'identity crisis.' In this sense,
"to be self-alienated...means to be something less than
one might ideally be if the circumstances in society (or in
his life) were otherwise....."2 9 One loses his identity or
self-hood. But how does one develop contradictory selves?
How could there be an ideal self and an actual self in the
person? How one develops a sense of identity has been
briefly discussed in the last chapter: The person develops
an awareness of who he is by interacting with others, and
to some of whom he may develop a strong attachment or liking
and wishes to be like them. These people are for him "sig-
nificant others,"0 who influence his behavior and his
development of his own 'self-image.' Thus, his image of
his self, his idea of what kind of person he is, is deci-.
sively influenced by what others, especially significant
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others, think of him. Their attitudes of approval and of
disapproval affect, if not determine, his ideal self-image
and also make him become aware of his actual self-image.3 1
Another explanation for the loss of self, the loss of
identity may be found in the role theory: A social role is
a 'slot' into which people fit, e.g., mother, child, student,
physician, auto mechanic, etc. The role carries with it
certain duties and functions in a group or in society, and
with them responsibilities. But when there occurs a condi-
tion wherein the role does not satisfy the individual's own
needs and he becomes alienated from the role, he becomes
irresponsible.3 2 Moreover, because the role is an important
factor in acquiring a sense of identity, because an identity
with the role equates realization of one's self --e.g.,
'I am an architect,' 'I am a teacher,' 'I am a mother,' etc.
- alienation from the role becomes characteristic of self-
alienation, of 'identity crisis.'
This situation corresponds to both the worker's condi-
tion as it has been described: and the condition of anomie.
Ruitenbeek, for example, elaborates on the relationship of
the latter to the problem of identity, in which he also
talks about "role confusion." He asserts that in the
"dynamic society" such as ours of high industrialism and
high mobility, where the .human environment is reduced to a
series of fleeting contacts with strangers or near strangers,
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man can no longer find security in the continuity of his
environment. In this situation, identity is endangered,
for it is bound to reflect the discontinuity of the social
environment; a man living in so. mobile a world will be less
sure of himself and of others than a person in more stable
surroundings." Ruitenbeek
anomic condition renders the
and how "those who engage in
experience a fragmentation of
Thus, the person out of
of touch with his own self.
"In the normal course of her
becomes the instrument of an
becomes self-alienated.....
goes on to illustrate how an
human relationship impermanent
them are increasingly apt to
their identity."3 5
touch with others is also out
As C. Wright Mills writes:
work, because her personality
alien purpose, the salesgirl
Men are estranged from one
another as each secretly tries to make an instrument of the
other, and in time a full circle is made: One makes an
instrument of himself and is estranged from It also."
The person out of touch with the essence of his self con-
ceives of himself as an intrinsically meaningless, utili-
tarian means toward certain goals or rewards. He is "other-
37directed," to borrow the term from Riesman., The person
learns that "nothing in its character, no possession he
owns, no inheritance of name or talent, no work he has done,
is valued for itself, but for its effect on others....." 3 8
The person works not for the work nor fo: himself, but for
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money which can buy him an automobile or a house in the
suburb; he is self-alienated.
Seeman defines this mode of alienation as "dependence
of the given behavior upon anticipated future rewards, that
is upon rewards that lie outside the activity itself."3 9
We have in this section come across the relationships
of the concept of identity to the concepts of anomie and
of self-estrangement. Ruitenbeek argues that identity is
a matter of personal problem in a condition of anomie,
accompanied by "industrialization, urbanization, the growth
of wealth, the decay of tradition, the retreat from public
concern and deeply held personal relationships, all the
characteristics of a society that says it is based on indi-
vidualism and thwarts the expression of individuality..." 40
Thus, according to Ruitenbeek, the identity problem is
caused by the condition of anomie in society. Another
argument presented is the relationship between self-estrange-
ment and the loss of self-hood, the loss of identity.
The question posed in the last chapter, when the case
of user-generated environmental change at M. I. T. was pre-
sented,was: What is 'alienation' when one cannot assert his
identity to his physical surroundings? Obviously, as Linn
has suggested, it is alienation or estrangement from that
physical surroundings. Although it has been suggested
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that it is unlikely that the person loses his identity if
he cannot assert his imprints to the physical environment,
that very environment, however, can become very much
a part of him if it is used for the purpose of, or if it
plays a function of, his identity development and/or mainte-
nance. This is perhaps the reason why people have their
'own' places about which they can claim, 'this is me!'; and
when they go out to downtown or some place with which or in
which they have no intimate or personal associations, they
describe those places as, indeed, 'impersonal,' 'depressing,'
'cold,' 'alienating,'.....
If the individual regards the physical environment as
a 'tool' of identity development (consciously or subcon!-
sciously), or if the individual identifies his self with the
physical environment 'matter-of-factly,' then the complete
loss of his essential self may result (as in the material-
istic process analogy of objectivation-objectification and
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alienation-reification ). The person identifies himself
with the cold, alienating environment and he himself comes
to possess those characteristics, self-estranged. Erik
Brikson, in a recent article in the "Wlashington Post," notes
that "identity is a person's sense of being at one with him-
self and with his surroundings."4 3  This poses a great dan-
ger in our age when "semi-alienation has become an estab-
lished expectation in a mass society."44
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I have jumped a little. Another question is still
remaining: Assuming it is not so hopeless, what might the
users do to these alienating environments? Do they refrain
from it all and remain passive and alienated (as I specula-
ted)? Despite my speculation, it is, as in any case, diffi-
cult to generalize an answer to this question. However,
there are some examples, including the case at M. I. T.,
which suggest that at one time or another the frustrations
break out. Yet, the cause of the frustration is hard to
pinpoint. Whether or not the frustration is from the reason
that the person cannot identify with the environment --he
cannot leave his personal imprints on the environment-- is
yet unknown and one can only speculate on this matter.
The relationships that have been developed through
examination of the various modes of alienation and the case
analysis of the student-generated environmental change at
M. I. T. do suggest, however, that the dominant cause is
not environmental but social, or political if you will.
Some of the activities in which the user does things to his_
physical environment are a manifestation of the user's alie-
nation from the social process. The user who cannot iden-
tify himself with the physical environment associates it with
the alienating or anomic condition of society. Because the
environment is something in which and with which he must
live, he attempts to make it his 'own' or into an environ-
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ment that is not alienating to him.
Can he achieve an identity with the environment and
still be alienated? As the term alienation has been refer-
red to in this particular instance --alienation from the
physical environment-- he is not alienated from the environ-
ment as long as he identifies himself with it in positive
terms; it becomes part of him. (This is precisely the dan-
ger of self-alienation through the physical environment;
one is not aware of his alienation even if he becomes criti-
cal and negative.45) Whether or not identity with the envi-
ronment eliminates alienation from the social process and/or
from his own self is doubtful. (Although I have in the pre-
ceding paragraphs, especially in page 36, stressed the re-
lationship of the concept of identity development and the
role of the physical environment, just how or how much
significance this relationship has in the development and
maintenance of identity is unknown.)
N1ow, to relate all this to the student-generated envi-
ronmental chaige at M. I. T.: Were the students self-.
estranged; were they seeking identity with their environ-
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ment, to be specific? There is an indication that they
did not identify themselves with the dominant "Establishment
architecture and education," which implies that they had
some different ideas. The ideas were, in a sense, trans-
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lated into mezzanines with which they came to identify them-
selves. For them, the original condition of the drafting
rooms manifested the things with which they did not identify.
So, here again, there is a relationship. It was an aware-
ness of the conflict between the ideal surroundings and the
actual ones that played a role in generating this environ-
mental change.
To summarize, we have discussed in this chapter the
meaning of alienation by analyzing it in four modalities:
powerlessness, meaninglessness, anomie or social alie-
nation, and self-estrangement. The person is powerless
when knows or believes his activity will fail to yield the
results he seeks; he feels meaningless when he has no clear
understanding of the events in which he takes part, when he
does not know what he-should believe in and why he should
behave precisely in some fashion and not otherwise. Norm-
lessness is a situation in which the person encounters con-
tradictory role expectations and is compelled to behave in
a socially unapproved way to achieve the purposes; isolation
is estrangement of the person from the dominant aims and
values of his society. Under the condition of anomie, five
adaptive methods develop: conformity, innovation, ritualism,
retreatism, and rebellion.
Also related to the concept of anomie is the concept of
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identity. In a socially fragmented, uncohesive, anomic
condition, the individual has difficulty identifying him-
self with his role(s) and with the constantly changing
environment, whereby he develops an 'identity crisis.' The
identity problem as loss of self in turn is linked with the
concept of self-estrangement, another type of alienation,
which is the individual's estrangement from his self, the
feeling that his own self and its abilities are something
strange, not his.
We have seen certain relationships between these con-
cepts of alienation and anomie and of user-generated envi-
ronmental change. The user who feels powerless or meaning-
less does things to his physical surroundings --in the case
of the M. I. T. students, awareness of powerlessness seem
to have followed that of meaninglessness. There have been
also an element of anomie involved: innovation. The envi-
ronmental change at M. I. T. manifested, moreover, the use
of the physical environment to reflect the students' iden-
tity with an alternative mode of architectural practice and
education.
Let us now examine more cases of this particular
activity in the physical environment.
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CHAPTER THREE
ALIENATIONI AND USER-GENERATED ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE
In this chapter the documentations of user-generated
environmental changes are examined, specifically to seek
and test the validity of the relationships (of alienation
to user-generated changes in the physical environment) con-
structed in the previous chapter. I do not pretend to pre-
sent new first hand research. The cases presented are
documentations of those environmental changes by others
(architects, planners, social scientists, and the users).
Consequently and because the first hand raw materials are
unavailable, this study heavily relies upon the accounts of
the authors of these documentations.
1. A Theoretical Proposition: Hypotheses
Let me first restate the proposition on the relation-
ships of alienation and anomie and of user-generated envi-
ronmental change.
The proposition is that some of the changes the user
makes in his physical environment are a result of the user
being confronted with an alienating condition in which he
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is or feels powerless, meaningless, and/or self-estranged
(i.e., threatend. of his sense of identity); such changes
also occur in an anomic condition in which the user is com-
pelled to conform or ritualize, innovate, retreat, and/or
rebel. Let me put this in the form of questions:
1) Do some of user-generated environmental change occur as
a result of the user having or sensing little or no signifi-
cant ability to determine or control the results he seeks
in the matters that concern him?
2) Do they occur as a result of the user's little or no sig-
nificant ability to predict outcomes of the situation he is
in? That is, does the user do things to the physical envi-
ronment when he is in a situation about which he has little
or no sense 'of understanding?
3) Or, are they a result of the situation in which the user
becomes aware of 'crisis' or loss of his identity, i.e.,
self-estrangement?
4) Does the user do things to the envirounent because every-
body else does it, and because it is accepted as a 'good
thing' to do?
5) Do the users, who hold low reward value. to goals and
beliefs of society generate changes in,'or act upon, the
physical environment?
With these (closely related) questions, let us examine
the documentations of user-generated environmental changes.
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2. Analyses of the Documentations
a) Quartiers Modernes Fruges, Pessac, France.
The case we examine here is documented by the French
architect Philippe Boudon with his sociologist colleague:
"Lived-in Architecture."*
Le Corbusier, one of the great 'master' architects of
the twentieth century, was comuissioned to develop, design,
and get built his ideas of architecture as a "machine to
live in" by Henry Fruges in Pessac near Bordeaux, France.
The Quartiers Modernes Fruges was a "laboratory (where) Le
Corbusier would be able to 'put his theories into practice
and carry them to their most extreme conclusions.'"2 Thus,
in 1926 some fifty houses were built in Pessac. In 1967,
forty-one years later, Boudon conducted a study of the
extraordinary transformations the inhabitants made to these
houses. The houses were built according to a basic stand-
ardized unit of reinforced concrete to which windows, doors,
staircases, and mechanical equipments of equally standardi-
zed sizes were placed. To these houses the inhabitants of
the Q. M. F. (Quartiers Modernes Fruges) have added extra
rooms, garages, pitched roofs over flat roofs, flower pots,
trellises, fences, walls, doors, gates, paints, etc. The
large windows have been made smaller, some walls have been
* The footnotes and references for this chapter are found
in page 93.
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removed, and so on and so forth.
What were the motivations of the users? What elements
or factors were involved in engendering these incredible
changes? Boudon suggests a cultural phenomenon as one of
the significant attributes: the traditional dwellings of
the region, "lean-to house" and the "country house."3 In
these dwellings conversion is a frequent feature, and the
people in the Bordeaux region tend "to regard this type of
structure as ideal"4 and as "normal."5 Le Corbusier, albe-
it not by intention, provided houses with open, free, and
simple plans.6 The users, who regarded conversion in
dwellings as a normal phenomenon, obviously took advantage
of such layouts, as Boudon notes:
Le Corbusier's design lent itself quite readily
to simple alterations, which allowed the Pessac
houses to be brought more or less into line with
the traditional lean-to house. By erecting a
partition wall the occupants could --and in many
cases did-- build a corridor running along one
side of their houses, thus creating the really
essential feature of the single-fronted lean-to
house.
7
Aside from these physical environmental changes being
a cultural phenomenon, there is a functional element of
anomie. With regard to the large windows that have been
made smaller, Boudon notes that this very act was based on
the users' assessment of what a window should look like
(as in the case of what an "ideal and normal" house is
supposed to be), but this very assessment is based on the
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"established standards of taste."8 He demonstrates, more-
over, that some of these changes were due to the "conser-
vative thinking" of the region in general, which, in some
cases, "had developed into conformism."9 For example,
one of the inhabitants wanted to have a "large bay (window)
built on overlooking the garden 'as is customary nowadays'
. .... "1O So, this user plans to introduce physical change
in her house by putting a large bay because everybody else
does it, because it is a thing to have just as everybody
else has it. There seem to be much "inherent conformism,"
as Boudon puts it1 , involved in many of these activities
(of conversion) at Pessac. It is recognizably a grave chal-
lenge to contend this normally accepted phenomenon as a
function of anomie or social alienation. But this conformism,
while it means harmony, also implies 'obedience' and contra-
dicts autonomy, self-governance. Anomie, as it has been
defined, is indeed a cultural phenomenon and implies a break-
down of the value system.12 Conformity can be regarded as,
in a critical term, a cooptive mechanism of the culture; it
rationalizes itself.
Was there any indication of powerlessness as a gene-
rating factor of environmental change at Pessac? One of the
residents, when asked about ideas about his house:
".....We-all-of-us-always-have-our-own-ideas! We want our
own house, don't we! for ourselves...and we want it the
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way...the way we want to have it!"13 This user obviously
has observed many conversions that have taken place at
Pessac and feels change is necessary:
As I told them...do it for yourselves, don't con-
vert anything for your children because,' no matter
who moves in when you leave, whether it's your
children or strangers, they're bound to pull some-
thing down. They won't like things the way they
are. You've put the door there, they'll want it
oter there! You've closed up a wall to make...
they'll build a door in it or else knock it down
to make a larger room (and that's happened before
now): there are houses dovm there, the people took
out a large partition wall, made a large kitchen
and thought it was absolutely marvellous...and
now, huh...the good man has put the partition back,
so that the kitchen's the same size as it was
before, in order to make an extra room for one of
his children...you see?...people will always make
changes...there's nothing 'amazing' about it.
No...any house, no matter how well designed it
might be, will never completely suit the family
that goes to live in it... There's always something
that needs to be changed. It does no harm...and
it's good for trade... I've lived here for twenty
years now and I've seen it happen time and again;
there are houses which have had three or four
different owners, and they've all pulled down
something or other and then rebuilt, each according
to his taste...it's a way of life... 14
Although it is hard to determine from the documentation on
the individual experience of powerlessness because there is
no account of the social context 6f the users in the docu-
mentation, it is obvious that these users have always been
able to do anything they wish to their houses. The first ques-
tion on the sense of powerlessness, therefore, does not
apply for the very reason that these inhabitants do have
the power to control as far as the environmental matters
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are concerned; from the documentation, it appears that the
environmental changes generated by the users at Pessac are
not a result of them being confronted with an alienating
situation. They have the power and the ability to control
or determine the matters which concern them to the ways of
their houses. Although the hypothesis posed in the form
of question (if the users were having little or no signifi-
cant ability to control when they did things to their
surroundings) does not directly apply to this case, the
importaince of that ability to control is very well manifes-
ted in the quote of the user and the activities themselves.
As one woman proudly talks of her husband who "has made
thirty-six different designs."1 5
How about the question (2), the sense of meaningless-
ness? There is an interesting account of this factor and
its consequence. Boudon notes that the Q. M. F. district
has been called the "Moroccan" district.16 He finds "the
heart of the matter" in the fact that "the occupants found
the terraces (which was a design feature of the house by
Le Corbusier) quite meaningless and, since it was imparative
that they should have a meaning, they made this comparison
with Arab architecture," thereby making Le Corbusier's
'international' style 'regionalized.,17
This notion of meaninglessness applies better to the
question (3); the concept of identity. Boudon states:
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For them objects could not exist in their own right,
they had to evoke other objects and so enter into
a meaningful context. The important thing about
this evocation of Arab architecture on the part of
the occupants of the Q.M.F. was their apparent need
to identify with a specific country or specific -
region a type of architecture which they insisted
on regarding as alien because they found it strange.
It would, of course, be quite a simple matter to
find alternative meanings for Le Corbusier's archi-
tecture. The description of the Pessac houses...
as 'Fruges cubes of sugar' (--Fruges owned a sugar
factory--) was, in fact, an attempt to do precisely
that.....18
This concept of identity, although it is not directly linked
with the identity-self-estrangement hypothesis as I have put
forth, perhaps has something to do with the activity of
user-generated environmental change at Pessac. Even though
they have identified these houses with a particular style
of architecture and a region, the houses as physical objects
and as their own shelters were stll foreign and alien in
their appearances and even the features. Could it be that
there developed in their minds crises about their senses of
own identity? A woman (who does not live in the Q. M. F.)
declares, "To my mind-, the sort of building that would suit
this place would be a big house with a four-sided pitched
roof.u'9  A resident in the Q, M. F. who did not like the
house, especially the appearance, at first but nonetheless
liked the layout of the interiors and moved in, tells:
".....and as for the outside, well, you know, we had it
repainted, had it done up, it really was very good...hm...
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you know, it was the prettiest house in the district in
'42....."20 Another resident actually did put a pitched
roof over the terrace.21 Could it have been that there
was a threat to their identities when they were motivated
to do the things they did to their houses --they did it to
the point where the house was the prettiest in the district?
All through the process of making transformations to their
satisfaction in their house, they gradually developed a
strong identification with it --they did it to the point
where they "got used to it and then (they) liked it. (They)
liked it very much."22
The fourth question,. the relationship of conformity
and physical changes at the Q. M. F. has already been dis-
cussed. There is no hint in the documentation on the re-
lationship of retreatism and rebellion to user-generated
environmental change, which is the fifth question.
In summary, the case of the Q. M. F. indicates that
there are elements associated with the concept of alienation
and the concept of anomie involved in user-generated
environmental change.
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b) Western Native Township, Johannesburg.
Western Native Township was built when some two thou-
sand houses were constructed to house fifteen thousand
Africans between 1918 and 1931, five miles away from the
city center of Johannesburg in South Africa. Almost all
houses consisted of two rooms, verandah, approximately
three hundred square feet of enclosed space; made of un-
plastered bricks and corrugated iron roofs; had no bathroom,
no separate kitchen, no ceilings, no internal doors, and no
direct services, i.e., no individual water-supply nor elec-
tricity. No one could own a house in the Western Native
Township, but the tenants were allowed to modify their
houses.
Some forty years later Julian.Beinart23 conducted a
study of what had transpired in this township. Changes the
tenants made in their physical environment are as dramatic
as, those at Pessac, if not more so. Categorically, there
have been three types of environmental changes. First in
the category is very few in number but most, shall I say,
expensive: the users added up to three rooms; installed
electricity, ceilings, concrete floors, plastering, and
tiling; and the money spent for these alterations amounted
as much as up to five times the cost of the original house
--these were done at the cost of the tenants. Second cate-
gory consists of adding rooms to the back of the house and
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in some cases electricity --these were operated by the muni-
cipality but the rent was increased. The last category is
the most common alteration: this consists of only changes
to the front and street-facing facades of over eighty per-
cent of the houses; the "front verandah was either partially
or completely enclosed and the front wall plastered."24
Most of these changes (in three categories) were accompanied
with most extraordinary and incredible wall decorations of
symbols, images, and colors, which "often completely trans-
formed the appearance of the house and the street onto which
they faced."25
Motivations of the users for making these changes are
examined by Beinart. It has been found that these environ-
mental changes were engendered, firstly, as a result of the
utilitarian and existential needs: "the acute need of extra
space" triggered closing of the front porches, which further
led to reconstruction of the whole front facade of the
house.26 At the dame time, Beinart notes that the original
condition of the house was so incomplete and lacking any
quality that "it demanded some initiative action from the
tenant."27 Other reasons mentioned are: "to indicate
certain kinds of status, to display religious denomination,
to mark territory, even to show political affiliation," to
bring luck, identity, individuation, etc. 28 Further, specu-
lation on the cause of certain types of changes are made:
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the answer seems to lie partly in the nature of the
community, and partly in the way people copied from
one another. My experience in Western Native Tovm-
ship suggests that the decorations spread in the
community as a result of the emulation of certain
pace-setters, both as a desire for conformity and
as a result of competition.....29
Beinart goes on to compare his study with a similar aspect
in Herbert Gans' study of the "Levittowners," in which Gans
suggests that "conforming and copying occur more frequently
than competition, mostly to secure the proper appearance of
the block to impress strangers."30 Beinart is in agreement
that conformity was a stronger factor than competition, but
argues that the Western Native Township residents were not
engaged in a search for sameness. 1  Gans also makes a point
that the suburbanites prefer heterogeneity and "aesthetic
diversity."3 2
We have previously discussed the phenomenon of con-
formity. Gans correctly notes the function of conformity
as a social control mechanism, especially to secure, in this
case, the proper "appearance on the block, mainly concerning
lawn care."33' 3
The residents of the Western Native Township are
severely oppressed, powerless, non-white Africans. The
racial segregation in South Africa is well-known. They are
not even allowed to own their houses in the Western Native
Township. Moreover, as Beinart states, "after twenty years
of effort by the inhabitants to maintain Western Native
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Township as a viable community, the City Council were again
contemplating a political decision: one which would this
time destroy the community and disperse it to various posi-
tions outside the now-grown city."3 5 These users are power-
less; they can but sense no ability to control any result
they desire. The frustration of the Africans in South
Africa are illustrated in Beinart's concluding quote of
Anthony Sampson:
..... but some say that 'nearly every African
speaks of the intolerable frustrations in the
townships, the consciousness that there must be,
before long, a massive explosion. They can
sense it in the packed buses and the trains,
the barometers of African opinion..... 3 6
They are the people who cannot, are not allowed to, own
even their own places of residence. Thgy can only modify
the houses they live in, not to 'own' territory 7 , but to":
"mark" territory. Is this not a case where environmental
change was caused by the users' sense of powerlessness?
Is there not also a relation here to the sense of
meaninglessness when the users have no ability to control,
thus predict, that they can stay another day in the houses
that they do not own?
Identity through environmental action, poverty, and
general struggle has been developed, - When the Municipality
refused to compensate for the improvements the tenants
made:
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One of the officials showed some understanding of
the problem when writing in a memo: '...It must be
remembered that the sentimental value of their
houses is really more important than the intrinsic
value...' A resident of twenty years in WNT under-
stood it much better: '...originally we were handed
these houses in their base and barren constructions
and structures, in consequence of which all of us
started from scratch, plastering, pounding the
floors and pulverizing the walls, as well as apply-
ing some paintings...this incredible decision of
'penalising' the Natives against compensations is
that "WE HAVE MADE USE OF THE GROUTD AND DERIVED
COMFORT OF THESE IMPROYZESNTS.38
While the general concept of identity --the attachment of
the residents to the physical environment they have created
through transformations, and through struggles with the
authority-- applies here, it is also possible to speculate
on whether or not the users were self-estranged, or more
specifically, *hether or not -they were confronted with
'identity crisis,' which engendered them consequently to
act upon their environment. One could establish a relation-
ship here similar to the one in the case of the Quartiers
Modernes Frufges: The Africans, the tenants of the Western
Native Township were confronted with contradiction or the
difference between their tribal environments from which
they came and the alien, oppressive, urban environment of
the city into which they came. The identity they had devel-
oped in their tribal environments were thus at a loss in this
totally new situation. This led them to do things, certain
things to their new environment. Some, for instance, have
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"suggested that 'these (--decorations on their houses-)
are our traditional drawings and white people do not know
anything about them' or 'I wanted to show typical Tswana
design.' One Tswana woman even claims to have been sent
back to the reserves specifically to learn the designs..." 39
There are others who seemed to want to adjust their identity
to the urban life: "One resident...says that she specifi-
cally 'wanted something that would look modern instead of
the decorations we do on the farms. "
There is more to this: where Beinart notes, "...the
houses of WvNT are imagined versions of houses in white
suburbia --decorated WNT houses were called 'Parktovm,'
after the wealthiest suburb in Johannesburg-- decorated
with all the intensity necessary to make a shelter live up
to a dream."nl The (forced) users of the Western Native
Township clearly had ideal self-images modelled after some-
thing which they were not.
..... It is one thing to wait until you can achieve
your goals, it is another to know you can never
achieve them. Then you have to compress your
frustrated ambitions into what you have now and
you make your possessions look like those you will
never possess*42
Thus, certain environmental changes were generated when the
users of the environment either consciously or subconscious-
ly perceived 'crisis' or estrangement of their identity
which had been developed through their interaction with
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their tribal environments from the new, alien environment
with which they were confronted. The users also decorated
their houses to have them reflect their ideal self-images
against their actual ones. These users, at least some of
the residents of the Western Native Township, were engendered
to make changes in their places of habitat as a result of
self-estrangement of their senses of identity.
It is difficult to examine the fourth or fifth ques-
tions in this case of user-generated environmental change
(although I have touched upon the fourth question in dis-
cussing conformity), since it involves a number of multi-
cultural, tribal elements which are unknown. It would
require an extensive, thorough understanding of all those
intricacies inherent in any culture.
At any rate, this particular case does suggest that
the users' condition of alienation --powerlessness, meaning-
lessness vis-a-vis racism and oppression-- especially from
the world outside their Township in the city has played a
significant role as generating force of environmental
&otion. When people are alienated, when they are frustrated,
when their activities seem meaningless, and when they become
aware of their condition, the condition of alienation in
an oppressive system, they act rather than stay passive and
alienated. The physical environment which surrounds them
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day to day becomes subject of their frustrated (and alien-
ated?) "energy release."43 But when their action becomes
threatening to the oppressive system, confrontation results.
The example we discuss next illustrates just such a case.
c) People's Park, Berkeley.
There are few documentations or studies of this particu-
lar case of user-generated environmental change which
became a social, political, and environmental issue across
the country, and inspired a slogan, "Let a thousand parks
bloom." A brief chronology of the People's Park is in
order:44
The story begins with a small piece of land a few blocks
from the Berkeley campus. Several modest residencies
had been built there. In 1967 the University of Califor-
nia administration perceived that the character of the
surrounding neighborhood was deteriorating, and, despite
protests from the community, purchased the land for one
and three-tenths million dollars and tore down the houses.
The University had no immediate plans to build in the
area, and the vacant land became an untended parking lot,
full of pot holes, old beer cans, and weeds.
By spring of 1969, the street culture in Berkeley was
becoming increasingly vocal and militant. Its ranks had
been swelled by young people who had come into the San
Francisco Bay Area for the *Summer of Love' and remained.
The street people were developing; a spectrum of neighbor-
hood institutions which emphasized participation, sharing,
impulse expression, and the expansion of consciousness.
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Out of this came Switchboard, a community telephone in-
formation service, and the Free Store, where used cloth-
ing was collected and given away, free clinics, communes,
underground papers, and other things that seemed new at
the time. Almost everything had its counterpart in other
places or at other times, but in 1969 they seemed to fit
together into a particular life style.
As sunmer approached, the Berkeley street people became
concerned with the deteriorating physical environment
around Telegraph Avenue. The same creative impulses that
had gone into the free clinic and the free church began
to focus on the vacant litter-strewn lots in the area.
People asked why these vacant lots could not become parks
--not the typical manicured lawns and neat rows of trees
that are maintained by the city, but different kinds of
parks created and maintained by the neighborhood itself.
Leaflets and notices in underground papers announced that
park development activities would begin on April 20.
Many people from the surrounding area, including mothers
with children and retired people who wanted to plant some-
thing with their own hands, joined in the activity. It
had been estimated that almost one thousand people a day
were involved in this project. Design students as well
as professional landscape designers and architects in the
area contributed labor, expertise, and equipment for
bringing in soil and planting shrubs and trees. Governor
Ronald Reagan viewed this activity as a threat to law and
order and so did several members of the University Board
of Regents. Although the students voted overwhelmingly
to keep the land as a park, their votes could not eradi
cate the powerful pressures upon the Chancellor of the
University of California to reclaim the land. At 3 a.m.
on May 14, 1969, University employees and Berkeley police
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posted 'No Tresspassing' signs around the park. Early
the following morning, police moved in with rifles and
tear gas, and an 8 foot high wire mesh fence was const-
ructed around the site. Several days of disturbances
ensued involving students, street people, police and
National Guardsmen.
The life of the People's Park in Berkeley is very
short. The generating force of this kind of activity had
been evolving during the 1960's, especially in the late
1960's when this environmental action actually took place.
It was in time of many social and political upheavals:
assassinations of a President of the United States, two
black leaders, a U. S. Senator who was a Presidential candi-
date; formations of socio-political groups, the S. D. S.,
the Black Panther Party, the Y. A. F., and many other groups,
both right-wing and left-wing; ghetto riots in the cities;
the Viet Nam war; campus riots; the riot at the Chicago
Democratic Convention in 1968; many arrests and many trials;
the rise of the counter-culture; the Peace Movement; and
so on and so forth.
Berkeley has been a site of many such upheavals as a
progressive college town. The Free Speech Movement was
triggered there in 1964. The Counter-culture Movement
always looked at what was happening in this San Francisco
Bay Area. In fact, when this People's Park incident came
on the news, the reaction was: "Berkeley is at it again."
60
The rise of the New Left intellectuals and the student
culture as well as anarchist groups, etc. were the most
vocal social critics, and much social and political con-
sciousness was generated, especially among the young gene-
ration. There were reports that the onct popular engineer-
ing schools were losing their students to the now popular
social science and humanities schools. Rebellion, in the
exact term Merton uses, was common place as the rise of the
counter-culture communes indicate. The frustrations of the
young, the generation gap, the Uncommitted4 5 , the frustra-
tion of the middle class life, all these were explained in
many ways. Among them were the concept of alienation and
that of anomie, the subject matters of this thesis. The
theme of "Power to the People" signifies the understanding
and awareness of the sense of powerlessness in general.
Subsequently, the need for participation, involvement,
community control, came to be much emphasized. Along with
this came the Ecology Movement, the Population Explosion,
and a concern for the quality of the environment. All these
put together form the general context in which the People's
Park was developed -as a conception, as an action, as a
confrontation, as a tactic for social change, and in the
end, as a learning process.
This particular case of user-generated environinental
change is comparable to that of the M. I. T. students which
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we discussed earlier. Perhaps, if one conducts an inventory
interviewing those who were involved in this activity he
would find many factors and motivations of the users. Some
probably joined the activity because it was a 'cool thing to
do,' because it was 'in' to get involved or to rebel against
the authority. But the most dominant and over-riding force
in the making of the People's Park was a concern for change
-- change of the way of life, how we relate to one another,
how the political process works, how the people should con-
trol their own lives and their own environment.....
A muddy, rutted piece of land stood vacant in the
center of our community for over a year, we listened
while University committees, community groups, and
others proposed the building of a park. We heard
the University protest that it had no funds, that
studies would have to be made, committees formed.
Finally, we took the land. We tended it, loved it,
planted trees, grass, mad flowers on it, made it
into People's Park.
We used the land. We hadn't tested and analyzed
the soil. We planted things and they grew. We
hadn't run a feasibility study. We had enough
labor, freely given, to build the Park. We had no
budgets. We found the money and materials we needed
in our community. We had no organization, no leader,
no committee. The Park was built by anyone and
everyone and we, all of us together, worked it out.
We were told we hadn't filled out the right forms,
hadn't followed the correct procedures, hadn't been
responsible, hadn't been patient. We had asked the
wrong questions, and built a beautiful park.
It was an incredibly good feeling, building that
Park. In this country of cement and steel cities,
better suited for its machines than for its people,
we made a place for people. At a time when only
experts and committees, qualified and certified,
are permitted to do things, we did something our-
selves, and did it well. For all of us, hip and
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straight, the Park was something tangible that
we had done, something that drew our community
together. The Park was co:mon ground. People's
Park existed for a little more than a month.
On 'Bloody Thursday,' the day fence went up around
People's Park, we took to the streets. The fence
stayed up, although the Chancellor supported a
park, the University professors supported the Park,
the student body voted for the Park, the City
Council asked for the Park, and 30,000 people
marched through the streets.
People's Park now stands empty and guarded.
The Park died, the idea that created it lives.
Let a thousand parks bloom!46
People's Park manifested the antithesis of the "old
culture" of the authority that "tends to give preference
to property rights over personal rights, technological
requirements over human needs, competition over cooperation,
violence over sexuality, concentration over distribution,
the producer over consumer, means over ends, secrecy over
openness, social forms over personal expression, striving
over gratification, Oedipal love over communal love, and
so on."47 It also reversed and demystified the 'theory' of
planning in favor of, and by the practice of, spontaneity.
There was little planning, little organizing, but there were
people who somehow shared the same feeling, the feeling of
alienation.
This user-generated environmental change posed a great
threat to the authority, for it proved right the antithesis
of the Establishment and what is more, it represented, phy-
sically, socially, psychologically, and politically, a case
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of user-generated 'social change' --change to eliminate
alienation.
3. Summary and Conclusion
We have in this chapter examined cases of user-gene-
rated environmental changes to see if there are grounds
upon which the theoretical proposition put forth holds.
In the case of extraordinary transformations carried out
by the residents of the Quartiers Uodernes Fruges in Pessac,
we have found that there were phenomena of conformity,
identity-self-estrangement, and the general feeling of the
users that people should change their own houses, coupled
with the regional tradition seemed to have contributed to
engendering environmental changes, among other factors of
influence.
At the Western Native Township in Johannesburg, the
tenants did things, most dramatic things to their environ-
ment. Again, the concept of identity-self-estrangerent,
the sense of meaninglessness, and most convincingly the
sense and the reality of the users' powerlessness manifest
their roles in the users' motivations and the cause of
environmental change.
The case of People's Park at Berkeley in 1969 tells us
how the authority, the powerful and oppressive system per-
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ceives and reacts to what it considers a threat when the
people take on action rather than remain passive and sub-
missive to it and alienated from the environment that sur-
rounds them.
All the cases studied, to restate, do suggest that
some user-generated environmental changes are associated
with the concepts of alienation and anomie --the sense of
powerlessness (in the case of Q. M. F., the sense of, and
existence of, control) and that of self-estrangement/iden-
tity are consistently evident throughout all these cases.
The users who feel (and in most cases are) powerless in
the matters that are of concern to them and yet not in their
control do things to the physical environment. They see
such environments as meaningless for the reason that they
do not respond to their needs. In some cases they regard
such environments as symbolic of the alienating structure
and condition: Sometimes the users do beautiful things to
their physical environment in order to have it reflect
their individual or collective self-images of themselves.
But in other occasions, they may destroy such environments
as we see in the ghetto riots when "a throng of furious
blacks in Watts (or Harlem, or Detroit, or Baltimore, or
Washington, D. C., or...) riot, loot and burn, destroying
square blocks of ghetto 'property.' They realize their
lack of control over their communities and lives." 48
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While there are many more reasons and factors involved,
some of which are mentioned earlier, it is important to
recognize alienation as one motivating and causal factor
in some user-generated environmental changes. These changes
are characterized by their scale, they are of small, human
scale and are easily handled by the users; they are less
'professional' or less 'esoteric' in appearance; and spon-
taneous, incremental, and perhaps accidental when they occur.
The next step or direction from this theoretical proposition,
as put forth in this thesis, might be to more systematically
analyze: who the users are; what type(s) of changes they make,
how they do; when they do; and how much or to what extent
they do, the why-they-do being based on the hypothesis of
this thesis. Co-relating all of these to alienation factors
(if alienation is "measurable") could provide us with an
important empirical information; user-generated changes in
the physical environments as indicators of the condition of
life and community.
Meanwhile, it is equally important to see what this
proposition implies to the practice of environmental design.
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CHAPTER FOUR
IMPLICATIONS
What do the relationships of the concept of alienation
to user-generated environmental change imply for the prac-
tice of environmental change? This is the question asked
in this chapter.
1. Dealingwith the Causes or the Consequences?
Le Corbusier, when he was developing the concepts for
design of the Quartiers LMlodernes Fruges at Pessac, had an
idea on the standardization of building components: "Stand-
ard components are letters; with those letters, and in a
particular way, you have to spell out the names of your
future house owners."*1 He also said, after a visit to see
what had transpired at Pessac: "You know, it is always
life that is right and the architect who is wrong....." 2
Recognizing that the users have to, and often do, alter the
physical environment in which they inhabit, the current
emphasis in environmental design and the practice of pro-
* The footnotes and references for this chapter are found
in page 99.
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viding frameworks which can be subjected to the energy
release of the users do seem justifiable. In fact, Boudon
asserts the Le Corbusier's Pessac project as being quite
successful in that "it facilitated and, to a certain extent,
even encouraged" the user participation in the shaping of
their places of habitat. In conclusion to "The Process of
Urban Participation," Beinart notes:
..... the Western Native Township brand of partici-
pation was and is not a singular activity. The
form it took was indeed unusual and approached that
of a communal art, but each culture will find its
own method, each with greater or lesser artistry.
What is important is not this artistic content --
worthy though the celebration of this undoubtedly
is-- but the existence of participation and its
recognition by physical designers, (be its symptoms
the scribbles on ghetto walls or the painted letter-
boxes of suburbia) . The participant has to modify,
often destroy, what the professional has made; to
make his environment viable, he has to subvert
master plans, discompose formalism and complicate
dull and puerile orders. The designer has a limited
relationship with the object he makes; the user has
to live with it and make it fit, cope with it as it
decays, and change it as he himself changes. 4
But he also warns that the environmental desigrer "must be
careful lest we fail to understand the true relevance of
the results of the kind of participation..... We should
not, placing the high value on choice which we do, expect
physical environments which deny such choice, nor should we
be proud when societies which we have allowed to remain
enclosed, immobile and frustrated, attract us with the
physical artifacts that they have produced as a result of
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these very conditions."5
It has been questioned earlier whether or not it elimi-
nates or reduces user's alienation if he acts upon the phy-
sical environment (p.38 ). It certainly must release the
user's frustrated energy. But, since the root of alienation
is in the social sphere, since the cause of user-generated
environmental change lies partially in the user's alienation
from the social process, frustration is bound to occur from
time to time. In this sense, to provide the user with an
environmental framework to which and within which he can
release his frustrated energy may be regarded as an energy
diversion. (Such energy itself becomes alienated for the
reason that the user is throwing it away into something
which is not of an intrinsic concern to him, especially if
the physical environment, the physical condition into which
the energy is released responds by being 'submissive' and
'manipulable' to the user.) It can become a sort of a
vicious cycle, and such a solution --providing a physical
framework or "support"-- is cooptive of the user's energy.
It diverts his concern.
Of course, one can argue that the Environmental de-
signer's' job has to do with creating the physical environ-
mant and that it is naive to expect that environmental
design can solve social problems. This argument is equally
cooptive; if it does not deny one's responsibility to his
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social role, it denies one's individual right to be him-
self --we must recognize here the effects of anomie and
self-alienation (i.e., conflicting role expectation,
etc.).
If alienation plays a part in engendering user-parti-
cipation in environmental change, and if we agree that
alienation is the problem, then we must seek to solve that
problem. Some of user-generated environmental changes
occur as a consequence of the user being confronted with
these conditions. The problem is not the consequence but
the cause of the condition. Alienation is a social rather
than a psychological problem at its root. (See Appendix
for a further discussion.)
2. The Dilemma
But how can one deal with the cause of alienation, or
anomie? Marx asserts it is a function of (or phenomenon
associated with) capitalism, private ownership. Durkheim
contends that anomie will be resolved with further perfec-
tion of the social division of labor with an agency of
moral authority. The latter almost sounds like an argwnent
of the status quo, which does not recognize the fact that
capital 'capitalizes' on the anomic (and forced) division of
labor and profits from it; i.e., division of labor functions
for centralized control.6
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Edwin M. Schur, a criminologist, asserts that it is
society that is sick, and "radical non-intervention" to its
criminal problems may be one way to cure the sickness.7
This is similar to the argument of many radicals. Igor S.
Kon, for instance, contends that the task of the Marxist
sociologist is to reject "utopianism and romanticism.....
for concrete social criticism, in which revolutionary
negation enters as an element of a constructive program of
activity."8
An environmental designer would probably ask how this
principle of dialectics is possible in environmental design.
Giancarlo de Carlo would say it is possible in the dialogues
with the users.9 But in most cases the tu ers are rarely
identified beforehand, for example in the case of public
housing (except by some abstract, sociological, and categori-
cal data of the prospective users, an awareness of this fact
might have led the .designers, in some cases, to 'provide'
user-manipulable 'frameworks' so as to thereby acknowledge
individual differences of each user in such an information).
Y7hat is needed, then, is. some mechanism whereby the users
can be identified at the beginning of the planning and design
process.
Another revolutionary practice might be to design as
oppressive an environment as possible so as to make the condi-
tion worse, with hope that the users would rebel and start
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generating not only environmental change per se but social
change.
But, taking into account of all the other factors
conducive to the causation of environmental change by the
users, the designer perhaps ought to provide frameworks in
which the users can 'do his own thing.' Yet, this does not
solve the problem of alienation. It is even doubtful if
the users want to do anything at all to their physical
surroundings, as Hamberg reminds us: "Contemporary planners
and architects ask how people can gain more control over
their environment and have searched for designs which permit
or encourage the individual to interact vth his environment,
supplying, for example, sliding walls. But these contri-
butions on the part of architects answer the issue only
partially. And inherent contradictions impede a full-scale
response. People who wish to control their environments
very likely lack that sense of control in other areas of
their everyday lives. And just because they are seldom
autonomous, they experience difficulty in relating indepen-
dently to their environment. In other words, the problem
adheres to others, and solutions will not be fully effective
unless similar efforts are made in other areas of social
and environmental life. As a young British architect has
observed:
'It is pointless for us to design buildings with
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partitions that can be moved, to permit freedom
of expression, when our whole educational develop-
ment is one that teaches us that we cannot control
our environment. Most people would never dream of
affecting the built environment, or of planting
trees themselves in the barren piece of 'keep off'
grass outside their house. Not till kids in
school can tear their buildings to bits every term
and re-erect it to their own design, can we see
people really expressing themselves in their build-
ing.' (Tom Wooley, "Architects, Buildings, and
People," ANARCHY, No. 97, 1969, p.69.)"1 0
One is still tempted to hope that perhaps through envi-
ronmental design, letting the users have a sense of control
might lead to a growing awareness of their needs for more
control and action. The residents of the Q. M. F. were,
because they had the power of control, aware of this need,
although only in the matters that concern their houses and
immediate environment. (It is unknown whether or not they
were aware df the need for control in other matters such as
work.) The participants in the case of People's Park not
only manifested their needs for control and 'power to the
people' through environmental action but also learned, it is
fair to say, the heart of the issue: social change and the
need for better strategies for change.
This thesis has presented, I should like to believe,
a view that it is necessary to be cautious in what we do in
practicing environmental design. It suggests the underlying
problems associated in the assumptions of the current and
prescribed emphasis in environmental design. And it suggests
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to us the need for more critical examinations of the pre-
scriptions and the pragmatic manifestation in environmental
design. Envii-onmental design 'problems' can only be relevant
if they see, include, and address themselves to social issues.
The practice must not diverge from the concern for the
fundamental issue of social change, of de-reification.*
* .For the definition of the term reification, see Footnote
42 of Chapter Two; also see pp.36-38.
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APPENDIX
THE ROOTS OF ALIENATION
Aside from the two schools of thoughts that are men-
tioned in Chapter Two --the Marxian concept of alienation
and the Durkheimian concept of anomie (or social alienation)
- there are others who claim that alienation is an indi-
vidual psychological aberration rooted in one's mental
order and that it can be cured throuGh psychoanalysis,
psychotherapy, etc. There are also those who propose
that alienation is part of the 'human condition,' the uni-
versal phenomenon, among whom Dostoevsky, and more notably
such existentialist thinkers as Kierkegaad, Nietzsche,
Camus, and Sartre. Indeed, alienation seems to be universal
phenomenon today when some social scientists list diverse
social groups as being alienated: e.g., the multitudes of
both blue collar and white collar workers who find their
jobs monotonous and degrading, the juveniles, bureaucrats,
women, the blacks and other minority groups, youth, old,
the prejudiced, etc.
The psychoanalysts (or psychiatrists) claim that man's
'drives' are subverted by his society and this subversion
places him in an antagonistic position to his society.*1
* The footnotes and references for Appendix are found
in page 100.
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In this antagonism he comes to distrust others and his
society and becomes alienated and incomplete. The psycho-
analytic notion of alienation has to do with repression of
man's 'drives.' When the person does not repress his drives,
when he freely expresses himself and his desires, he is no
longer alienated nor incomplete. A problem in this propo-
sition is that if it is society that subverts the individual,
obviously there is a problem on the part of the society.
For if the individual goes through an analysis or a therapy
and adjusts himself so that he can freely express himself,
there occurs eventually more conflicts between him and the
society which tends to force him to repress them. It is
either society (i.e., all individual members of society)
that needs to go through this transformation or the indi-
vidual needs to be adjusted so as to 'fit' into his society
--he has to learn how to repress his inner feelings 'suc-
cessfully.' In the latter case, however, "if psychiatry
merely helps the patient adjust to a sick society so that
he can function in it, it only moves him from one kind of
sickness to another."2 This obviously does not solve the
problem. We must examine the social context within which
these psychological disorders are engendered, as I have
briefly suggested in Chapter Two.
The basic text for a comprehensive view of the social
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basis of alienation is the early manuscripts of Marx:
"The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844."0 It is
important to understand those who influenced Marx before we
proceed to d scuss his concept of alienation.
The dialiectical mode of thinking, developed by Hegel4,
is one of the imporatnt foundations in Marx's philosophy.
It is a way of advancing thought through the development of
contradictions and their resolutions. Thinking, according
to Hegel, is the "negation of-that which is immediately
before us." 5  This is the basic system of Hegel's philo-
sophy of history: Change' evolves through series of contra-
dictions and develops through the stages of thesis, anti.-
thesis, and synthesis; ideas are derived from previous ones
by examining their limitations and contradictions, negating
until a more embracing one is reached.
Hegel also wrote on the phenomenon of alienation and
"(employed) the term to denote the alienation of conscious-
ness from the individual, the subject viewing himself as
the object, so that the entire objective world is nothing
"6but the 'alienated spirit,' and saw man's history as
that of alienation. But his writing was so abstract that
it intrigued many 'Hegelians' of the nineteenth century,
among them Feuerbach. Feuerbach saw Hegel's system (of
history) as a generalized forn of theology and asserted
that the "search for truth, in particular for truth in
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religion, must lead beyond Hegel's abstract 'Absolute' to
man in his relation to nature."'7  ("Absolute" here essen-
tially connotes the realm of pure thought as derived through
dialectics.) Feuerbach further argued that religion as well
as theology was a product of man, reflecting man's state.
This is true on the basis that man is the starting point of
history. It is man who created God, and it is man who
makes Him the creator and the ruler of the world. Thus,
Feuerbach observed that the more man puts into God, the
less he retains. This externalization of man's subjective
consciousness, i.e., of his "essential properties, of his
8
properties not as an individual but as a species," creates
God, Therefore, "religion is a form of alienation of man
from himself, a self-alienation, which destroys his appro-
priate fulfillment as a 'species being' and lets it exist
only as an illusion, in an imaginary world of God and
9heaven," whic h is alien to him. What was unacceptable
to Marx was Feuerbach's idealism.10 Feuerbach "as a philo-
sophic idealist...believed that alienation would be over-
come through the thought process, through the influence of
ideas or ethical striving."' 1 This thought is quite similar
to that of psychoanalysts in that both believe alienation
can be cured. To Feuerbach, Marx's criticism was that "the
object, reality, what we apprehend through our senses, is
understood only in the form of object or contemplation; but
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not as sensuous human activity, as practice; not subjective-
ly..... Feuerbach wants sensuous objects really distin-
guished from the objects of thought; but he does not under-
stand human activity itself as objective activity."1 2 Marx
saw the cause of alienation in social relationships, i.e.,
the condition that is more concretely material such as law,
politics and economy.
The way in which men produce their means of sub-
sistence depends first of all on the nature of
the actual means they find in existence and have
to reproduce. this mode of production must not
be considered simply as being the reproduction
of the physical existence of the individuals.
Rather, it is a definite form of expressing their
life, a definite mode of life on their part. As
individuals e:press their life, so they are.
What they are, therefore, coincides with their
production, both with what they produce and how
they produce. The nature of individuals thus
depends on the material conditions determining
their production.13
Marx thus emphasizes material conditions of life process and
labor as the basic causal forces of alienation and the
history of man. He regarded ideology as a rationalization
of economic-position (i.e., political economy) of the
ruling class, and interpreted history primarily in terms of
a series of class struggles.14
Capitalism, private ownership, according to Marxian
thought, brings about the condition of alienation, first,
because work under such a condition serves merely the profit
of the owner and not the interest of the worker: "It is
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true that labor produces for the rich wonderful things -
but for the worker it produces privation. It produces
palaces --but for the worker, hovels. It produces beauty
-but for the worker, deformity. It replaces labor by
machines, but it throws a section of the workers back to a
barbarous type of labor, and it turns the other worrers
into machines. It produces intelligence --but for the
worker stupidity, cretinism."15 Second, under this condi-
tion, the worker becomes victim to forces which he can
neither control nor understand. Under this condition, work
ceases to be the expression of the 'creative, human powers
of the worker.' The products created by his work acquire
an independent power and rule over the worker, just as in
the Feuerbachian analysis of religion.
The worker becomes all the poorer the more wealth
he produces, the more his production increases in
power and size. The worker becomes an ever cheaper
commodity the more commodity he creates. With the
increasing value of the world of things proceeds
in direct proportion the devaluation of the world
of men. Labor produces not only commodities: it
produces itself and the worker as a commodity --
and this in the same general proportion in which
it produces commodities.
This fact expresses merely that the object which
labor produces --labor's product-- confronts it
as something alien, as a power independent of the
producer. The product of labor is labor which has
been embodied in an object, which has become
material: it is the objectification of labor.
Labor's realization is its objectification.* In
the sphere of political economy this realization
* For the definition of the term objectification see Foot-
note 42 of Chapter Two; also see pp.36-38.
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of labor appears as loss of realization for the
workers; objectification as loss of the object and
bondage to it; appropriation as estrangement, as
alienation. 6
Thus, the worker feels powerless; his work is out of his own
control, is meaningless; and he is estranged from his work,
his essence, and therefore from his psyche and his self-
hood. 1 7 He does not
experience himself as an active agent, as the
bearer of human powers. He is alienated from these
powers, his aim it to sell himself successfully on
the market. His sense of self does not stem from
his activity as a loving and thinking individual,
but from his socio-economic role.., he experiences
himself not as a man, with love, fear, convictions,
doubts, but as that abstraction, alienated from his
real nature, which fulfills a certain function in
the social system. His sense of value depends on
his success: on whether he can make more of him,,
self than he started out with, whcther he is a
success. His body, his mind, and his soul are
his capital, and his task in life is to invest
it favorably, and to make a profit of himself.
Human qualities like friendliness, courtesy,
kindness, are transformed into commodities, into
.assets of the 'personality package' conducive to
a higher price on the personality market.18
Thus, as it has been stated earlier (p.34), self-estranged
person sees himself as a means, as a 'tool': "Since self-
estranged activity is a means to an end rather than an end
in itself, the satisfaction is in the future rather than
the present, and the tone of feeling approaches detachment
rather than involvement." 19
It is understandable why the do-it-yourself fad or the
self-help trend in hobbies, in gardening, in 'cooking from
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the scratch,' in carpentry, and in fact, in building indus-
try (which is the phenomenon that motivated me to undertake
this study) have developed when the work at factory or office
is out of control of the individual. 20 But again, as I have
argued earlier, it is not a solution to the problem; it is
only a superficial and partial answer.
If the root of the problem (of alienation) lies in
private ownership of the means of production, as Marx con-
tends, then it follows that freedom from alienation requires
a fundamental transformation in this sphere. 21
The more common and accepted view of the cause of
alienation sees industrialism and division of labor (about
which Marx, too, was concerned) as the problem. The one
who closely studied these phenomena is Durkheim, who has deve-
loped the term anomie.
Emile Durkheim, a student of social organization (and
a founder of empirical sociology), was interested through-
out his life-time in the forces that hold a society together
ot tend to disorganize it. In "The Elementary Forms of the
Religious Life,"22 he studies the contribution of religion
to social cohesion; his "Division of labor in Society"2 3
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analyzed two basic types of social solidarity --mechanical
and organic-- and introduced the concept of anomie, which
he later perfected (empirically) in the study of "Suicide."2 4
One of the important works related to that of Durkheim
is Ferdinand Tonnies' "Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft,"2 5
which dealt with the differences between the traditional
and modern societies. In a Gemeinschaft (i.e., traditional
or communal society) people feel they belong to each other
because they are of the same kind; they are kin and cannot
freely renounce their membership, which involves emotional
meaning for the group as well as for the individual. In
a Gesellschaft (i.e., modern associational society) the
major social bonds are voluntary and based on the rational
pursuit of self-interest; it weakens traditional bonds of
emotional involvement among the members and encourages
rationality and division of labor.
Durkheim did not agree with Tonnies' theory of Gesell-
schaft and argued that "the life of a large social agglome-
rations is just as natural as that of small groupings. It
is no less organic and no less internal. Outside of these
purely individual actions there is a collective activity in
our contemporary societies which is just as natural as that
of the smaller societies of previous ages. It is certainly
different; it constitutes a distinct type, but however
different they may be, there is no difference in nature bet-
ween these two varieties of the same genus....." 26
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To prove his point, Durkheim defines two types of
social' solidarity: mechanical and organic. , Mechanical soli-
darity refers to a social cohesion based upon a homoge-
neity of values and behavior, strong social constraint, and
loyalty to tradition and kinship; it applies to small
societies (as in Gemeinschaft) characterized by a simple
division of labor, very little specialization of function,
and very little individuation. Organic solidarity refers
to a type of social solidarity based on the interdepend-
ence of a very large number of highly specialized roles,
involving a complex division of labor that requires the
cooperation of almost all the groups and individuals of
the society.
The important point in Durkheim's theory is that vhile
there is little individuation in the traditional social
order, individualism that developed in the modern order is
a moral phenomenon. That is, while mechanical solidarity
in the traditional society is based upon the strong moral
consensus of the "conscience collective," individualism,
which is a product of the development of society, connotes
a morality of cooperation. The values and beliefs composing
moral individualism emphasize that each man should develop
his talents and capacities to their fullest extent: "In
the same way as the ideal of the less developed societies
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was to create or maintain as intense a shared life as
possible, in which the individual was absorbed, our ideal
is constantly to introduce greater equality in our social
relations, in order to ensure the free unfolding of the
socially useful forces."27
Moral individualism comprises beliefs and values, but
these are far more diffuse in form than those embodied in
the moral consensus characteristics of the traditional soc
order. The developmental process from traditional to
modern industrial society involved institutional changes,
which have fundamentally transformed the basis of social
unity and which have involved the progressive displacement
of mechanical solidarity by organic solidarity. Durkheim
contends that organic solidarity is the essential basis
of the modern order, and goes on to argue that organic sol
darity is still in transformation, i.e., it is not yet
actualized. When this moral rules of modern society is
inadequate, anomie results. It is the contention of many
Durkheimian social scientists that such is still the case
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today -- the condition of anomie.
Durkheim has recognized that with the progressive
division of labor and modernization, more-wealth is accumu-
lated. But in such a condition there is a great need for
an effective moral structure because "morality has the
function of limiting and containing that too much wealth so
i-
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easily becomes a source of immorality. Through the power
wealth confers on us, it actually diminishes the power of
things to oppose us. Consequently, it lends strength to
our desires and makes it harder to hold them in check.
Under such conditions, moral equilibrium is unstable: it
requires but a slight blow to disru pt it."-28 According to
Durkheim, if society creates and extends "human faculties,"
it must at the same time make them concrete and realizable,
which requires that they be ordered by moral regulations.
This is the fundamental idea put forth by Durkheim on the
concept of anomie. It is recognized that the biological
needs of man are limited, and therefore physical pleasure
cannot increase indefinitely. But in the case of the needs
and desires of a spiritual kind, which are derived from the
benefits conferred by society, it becomes a different story.
It is possible, for instance, that the more wealth and
riches one accumulates, the more dissatisfied he becomes,
for the horizon of his ambitions expands.
This is why those at the very top of the hierarchy,
who consequently would have nothing above them to
stimulate their aabiti.on, could nevertheless not
be held at the point they had reached, but would
continue to be plagued by the same restlessness
that torments them today. What is needed if social
order is to reign is that mass of men be content
with their lot. But what is needed for them to be
content, is not that they have more or less but
that they be convinced they have no right to more.
And for this, it is absolutely essential that there
be an authority whose superiority they acknowledge
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and which tells them what is right..... And since
in our hypothesis these needs are limitless, their
demands are necessarily without limit. For it to
be otherwise, a moral power is required whose
superiority he recognizes, and which cries out
'you must go no further.'29
Contrary to the common notion that the division of
labor in itself engenders anomie, Durkheim made it clear
that it is an "anomic" division of labor and a "forced"
division of labor that are conducive to the phenomenon.
The anomic division of labor occurs when extreme speciali-
zation is accompanied by a decline in communication between
persons performing different functions. Instead of being
drawn together by mutual dependence, i.e., organic solidari-
ty, individuals are separated and isolated from each other
by lack of understanding and narrowness of perspective.
This meagerness of communication results in a lack of
clearly defined rules regulating the interrelationships of
persons isolated in their specializations.
..... contrary to what is often said, the division
of labor does not produce these (degrading) con-
sequences because of a necessity of its own nature,
but only in exceptional and abnormal circumstances.
The division of labor presumes that the
worker, far from being hemmed in by his task, does
not lose sight of his collaborators, that he acts
upon them and reacts to them. Then he is not a
machine which repeats its actions without knowing
their meaning, but he knows that they tend, in some
way, towards an end that he can see fairly distinct-
ly. He feels that he is of some use. For that,
he need not embrace vast portions of the social
horizon; it is sufficient that he perceive enough
of it to understand that his actions have an aim
beyond themselves. From. that time on, as speciali-
zed and uniform as his activity may be, it is that
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of an intelligent being, for it has direction, and
he knows it. 30
The forced division of labor, on the other hand, occurs
when individuals are compelled to take on occupational roles
which they do not like and to which they are not suited.
Durkheim regarded caste and social class system as the
principal cause of forced division of labor. Custom or law
prevents persons from the lower classes from performing
certain functions even if they have the ability. According
to Durkheim, this is the primary source of class conflict.
Where Marx has perceived that class struggle occurs as
a result of economic inequality between the bourgeoisie and
the proletariat, and the history of man as a series of these
class struggles (and alienation of labor), Durkheim saw it
(class struggle) as a result of the lack of moral regulation
(in the case of the anomic division of labor) and of the
existence of the hereditary transmission of property (with
regard to the forced division of labor).
Durkheim argued that "anomie is not the experience of
an alien institutional order. It is a problem of the mean-
ingfulness of the actor's goals and situational chances
which under conditions of institutionalized scarcity leads
to non-normative but subjectively meaningful responses of
revolt, ritualization, and alienation." 3 2 He believed that
there must be a strong moral structure incorporated in the
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industrial order of society and that rewards be distributed
according to the natural inequalities of individuals. The
natural inequalities are "internal" inequalities of capacity
and aptitude, which are, according to Durkheim, ineradicable.
"External" inequalities such as property inheritance, etc.
can and will become dissolved with the further development
of the division of labor: labor must be divided "in such a
way that social inequalities exactly express natural inequal-
ities....."
Having more closely reviewed both Marxian analogy of
alienation and the turkheimian concept of anomie, it becomes
both easier and more difficult to cope or to better under-
stand the nature of the problem. The Marxian analogy tells
us that the problem lies in the private ownership, in capi-
talism. The Durkheimian theory of anomie tells us that the
problem is rooted in the breakdown of the moral structure
of modern social and industrial order. While the former
proposes the socialized ownership of the means of production
and of property as a precondition, a prerequisite, toward
emancipation of man; the latter suggests an agency of moral
authority as a solution to the problem of anomie. The
shortcoming with the latter is that (if not too positivistic)
it can be manipulated by various ideologies; it can, for
instance, be accommodating of the theory of the status quo.34
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APPEN-DIX
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101
7. Dirk J. Struik in his Introduction to Karl Marx, OP. CIT.,
p.16.
8. IBID., p.16.
9. IBID., p.16.
10. Marx was equally critical of Hegel's philosophy of his-
tory, for it "presupposes an abstract or absolute spirit,
which develops in such a way that mankind is only a mass
which carries this spirit, consciously or unconsciously.
Hegel assumes that a speculative, esoterical history pre-
cedes and underlies empirical history. The history of
mankind is transformed into the history of the abstract
spirit of mankind, which transcends the real man."
Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, THE HOLY FAMJILY: cited
in Erich Fromm, MARX'S CONCEPT OF MAN, New York, N. Y.:
Ungars, 1961, p.10.
11. Gaylord C. LeRoy, "The Concept of Alienation: An Attempt
at a Definition," in H. Aptheker (ed.), MARXISM AND
ALIENATION, New York, N. Y.: Humanities Press, 1965, p.7.
12. Karl Marx, "These on Feuerbach": cited in Fromm, OP.
CIT., p.11.
13 . Karl Marx, GERMAN IDEODOGY: cited in Fromm, IBID., p.10.
14. Marx wrote: "Political economy starts with the fact of
private property, but it does not explain it to us. It
expresses in general, abstract formulas the material
process through which private property actually passes,
and these formulas it then takes for laws, i.e., it does
not demonstrate how they arise from the very nature of
private property. Political economy does not disclose
the source of the division between labor and capital,
and between capital and land. When, for example, it
defines the relationship of wages to profit, it takes
the interest of the capitalists to be the ultimate
cause, i.e., it takes for granted what it is supposed to
explain. Similarly, competition comes in everywhere.
It is explained from external circumstances. As to how
far these external and apparently accidental circumstan-
ces are but the expression of a necessary course of
development, political economy teaches us nothing."
from "Estranged Labor," THE ECONOMIC AND PHILOSOPHIC
MANUSCRIPTS OF 1844, OP. CIT., p.106.
102
15. IBID., p.110.
16. IBID., pp.107-108.
17. This concept of self-estrangement is, as it has been
explained before, not quite same as the one I have used
in the hypothesis on the relationship of alienation
and behavior in the physical environment. I have used
self-estrangement as denoting an identity conflict, the
relationship of which is discussed in pp.31-37.
18. Erich Fromm, THE SANE SOCIETY, Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett
Premier, 1955, p.129.
19. Blauner, OP. CIT., pp.27-28.
20. Cf. Gerson, OP. CIT., pp.149-151; LeRoy, OP. CIT., p.3.
21. Paul Blumberg, for example, in his study of alienation
and participation, which (the latter) is increasingly
recognized and accepted as a positive way of humanizing
the workers' condition, concludes that there "is hardly
a study in the entire literature which fails to demon-
strate that satisfaction in work is enhanced or that
other generally acknowledged beneficial consequances
accrue from a genuine increase in workers" decision-
making power. Such consistency of findings, I submit,
is rare in social research." However, although parti-
cipation "is praised but no one asks any basic questions.
Instead, the present system of ownership and control is
merely assumed to be universal, despite the obvious fact
that economic experiments are everywhere to be studied.
But this is rarely done, and the current system is
assumed to be given and then, within the accepted frame-
work, minor adjustments (of supervisory techniques, for
example) are urged....." Paul Blumberg, INDUSTRIAL
DEMOCRA.CY: TBE SOCIOLOGY OF PARTICIPATION, New York,
N. Y.: Schocken Books, 1969, pp.123-129.
22, Emile Durkheim, THE ET=12 TARY FORMIS OF THE RELIGIOUS
LIFE, New York, N. Y.: The Free Press, 1965.
23. .............. , THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY, New
York, N. Y.: The Free Press, 1964.
24. Emile Durkheim, SUICIDE, Glencoe, Ill.: Thre Free Press,
1951.
1O3
25. The following account of the Tonnies' thesis relies
heavily on the summary described in C. Broom and
P. Selznick, SOCIOLOGY, New York, N. Y.: Harper & Row,
1968, p.48.
26. Durkheim, "The Division of Labor and Social Different-
iation," in Anthony Giddens (ed.), SELECTED WRITINGS,
Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1972,
pp.146-147.
27. Durkheim, quoted by Giddens, IBID., p.7.
28. Durkheim, "Anomie and the Moral Structure of Industry,"
in IBID., p.173.
29. IBID., p.177.
30. IBID., p.179.
31. Giddens, "Introduction," in IBID., pp.10-12
32j John O'Neill, SOCIOLOGY AS A SKIN TRADE, New York, N. Y.:
Harper Torchbooks, 1972, p.197.
330 Durkheim, OP. CIT., p.182.
34. LeRoy, OP. CIT., p.4.
104
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
105
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Herbert Aptheker (ed.), MARXISM AND ALIENATION, New York,
N. Y.: Humanities Press, 1965:
Herbert Aptheker, "Alienation and the American Social
Order,' pp.15- 25.
Sidney Finkelstein, "The Artistic Expression of Alie-
nation," pp.2 6-57.
Gaylord C. LeRoy, "The Concept of Alienation: An Attempt
at a Definition," pp.1-14.
ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN, Volume XXXVIII, August, 1968:
Rolf Goetze, "Squatters at M. I. T.," pp.387-388.
Karl Linn, "Neighborhood Commons," pp.379-382.
Lisa R. Peattie, "The Dilemma: Architecture in an Afflu-
ent Society," pp.361-364.
Julian Beinart, "Government-Built Cities and People-Made
Places," in David Lewis (ed.), THE GROWTH OF CITIES, London,
England: Elek, 1971, pp.18 4-207.
.............. , "The Process of Urban Participation," in
Institute of Social Research, FOCUS ON CITIES, Durban, South
Africa: University of Natal, 1968, pp.45-62.
Robert Blauner, ALIENATION AND FREDOM, Chicago, Ill.: The
University of Chicago Press, 1964.
Philippe Boudon, LIVED-IN ARCHITECTURE, Cambridge, Mass.:
The MIT Press, 1972.
Alan Copeland (ed.), PEOPLE'S PARK, New York, N. Y.: Ballan-
tine, 1969.
Giancarlo de Carlo, "Legitimizing Architecture," Dutch FORUM,
Volume XXIII, No. 1, 1972, pp.8-20.
Hans Peter Dreitzel (ed.), RECENT SOCIOLOGY, NO. 2, New York,
N. Y.: Macmillan, 1970:
Claus Mueller, "Notes on the Repression of Communicative
Behavior," pp.101-113.
Trent Shroyer, "Toward a Critical Theory for Advanced
Industrial Society," pp.210-234.
t06
Emile Durkheim, SELECTED WRITINGS, (edited with an Introduc-
tion by) Anthony Giddens, Cambridge, England: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1972.
Amitai Etzioni, THE ACTIVE SOCIETY, New York, N. Y.: The
Free Press, 1968.
Lewis Feuer, "What is Alienation? The Career of a Concept,"
in M. Stein and A. Vidich (eds.), SOCIOLOGY ON TRIAL,
Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963, pp.127-147.
John Friedman, RETRACKING AMERICA: A THEORY OF TRANSACTIVE
PLANNING, Garden City, N. Y.: Anchor, 1973.
Erich Fromm (ed.), MARX'S CONCEPT OF MAN, New York, N. Y.:
Ungar Publishing Co., 1961.
......... TEE SANE SOCIETY, Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett
Premier, 1955.
Herbert J. Gans, THE LEVITTOWNERS, New York, N. Y.: Vintage
Books, 1967.
Walter M. Gerson, "Alienation in Mass Society: Some Causes
and Responses," SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL RESEARCH, Volume 49,
No. 2, 1965, pp.143-152.
Herbert Gintis, "Activism and Counter-Culture," TELOS,
Number 12, Summer, 1972, pp.42-62.
.............. , "Alienation and Power," TE REVIEW OF RADICAL
POLITICAL ECONOMICS, Volume 4, No. 3, pp.1-34.
.............. , "A Radical Analysis of Welfare Economics and
Individual Development," THE QUARTERLY JOURIAL OF ECONOMICS,
Volume 86, 1972, pp.572-599.
Robert Goodman, AFTER THE PLAUNERS, New York, N. Y.: Simon
and Schuster, 1971.
Hans H. Harms, "Environment Studio: Workshop for Users,"
ReseARCH, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Department of Architecture,
Volume 1, No. 2, 1970, pp.8-9.
............. , "The Dilemma of the Architect," unpublished
manuscript, 1972.
Irving I. Horowitz (ed.), TE NEW SOCIOLOGY, New York, N. Y.:
Oxford University Press, 1964:
107
Ernest Becker, "Mills' Social Psychology and the Great
Historical Convergence on the Problem of Alienation,"
pp.108-133.
Ephraim H. Mizruchi, "Alienation and Anomie," pp.253-267.
Marvin Scott, "The Social Sources of Alienation," pp.239-
252.
Igor S. Kon, "The Concept of Alienation in Modern Sociology,"
SOCIAL RESEARCH, Volume 34, No. 3, 1967, pp.507-528.
Laboratory of Community Psychiatry, "Report from a National
Workshop on Community Crisis Intervention," Boston, Mass.:
Harvard Medical School, 1971.
Tomas Maldonado, DESIGN, NATURE, AND REVOLUTION, New York,
N. Y.: Harper & Row, 1972.
Herbert Marcuse, COUNTER-REVOLUTION AND REVOLT, Boston,
Mass.: Beacon Press, 1972.
............... , ONE-DIMIENSIONAL MAN, Boston, Mass.: Beacon
Press, 1964.
Gary T, Marx (ed.), MUCKRAKING SOCIOLOGY, New Brunswick,
N. J.: Transaction Books, 1972.
Karl Marx, THE ECONOMIC AND PHILOSOPHIC MANUSCRIPTS OF 1844,
(edited with an Introduction by) Dirk J. Struik, New York,
N. Y.: International Publishers, 1964.
......... , THE GRUNDRISSE, (edited with an Introduction by)
David McLellan, New York, N. Y.: Harper Torchbooks, 1971.
Robert K. Merton, ON THEORETICAL SOCIOLOGY, New York, N. Y.:
The Free Press, 1967.
Istvan Meszaros, MAIX'S THEORY OF ALIENATION, New York,
N. Y.: Harper Torchboocs, 1972.
C. Wright Mills, POWER, POLITICS, AND PEOPLE, (edited by)
Irving L. Horowitz, New York, N. Y.: Oxford University Press,
1967:
"Man in the Middle: The Designer," pp.374-386.
"Two Styles of Social Science Research," pp.553-567.
Wilbert E. Moore, "The Utility of Utopia," AMERICAN SOCIO-
LOGICAL REVIEW, Volume 31, 1966, pp.7 6 5-772.
108
Walter McQuade (ed.), CITIES FIR TO LIVE IN, New York,
N. Y.: Macmillan, 1971:
Roy Blumhorst, "'Welcome to Marina City' -The Shape of
the New Style," pp.26-29.
Jerry Finrow, "Community Involvement, Pros and Cons,"
pp.117-122.
Mayer Spivack, "The Political Collapse of a Playground,"
pp.128-134.
John Wiebenson, "Planning and Using Resurrection City,"
pp.58-68.
Oscar Newman, DEFENSIBLE SPACE, New York, N. Y.: Macmillan,
1972.
Peter Orleans and W. R. Ellis (eds.), RACE, CHANGE, AND
URBAN SOCIETY, Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications,
1971:
Lisa R. Peattie, "Public Housing: Urban Slums under
Public Management," pp.285-310.
Melvin Seeman, et al., "Community and Control in a
Metropolitan Setting," pp.423-450.
John O'Neill, SOCIOLOGY ASA SKIN TRADE, New York, N. Y.:
Harper Torchbooks, 1972.
Neil Pinney, TOWARD PARTICIPATORY DWELLING DESIGN, Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Community Projects Laboratory, 1972.
G. M. Platt and F. Weinstein, "Alienation and the Problem
of Social Action," in E. A. Tiryakian (ed.), THE PHENOIMENON
OF SOCIOLOGY, New York, N. Y.: Appleton-Century-Crofts,
1971, pp.284-310.
H. M. Proshansky, et al. (eds.), ENVIRONZMTAL PSYCHOLOGY,
New York, N. Y.: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1970.
Yanni Pyrgiotis, THE CASE OF ADVOCACY PLANNING, Cambridge,
Mass.: unpublished MIT thesis, 1972.
Shoukry T. Roweis, "Critique of FREEDOM TO BUILD," unpub-
lished MIT paper, 1972.
Hendrik M. Ruitenbeek, THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE CROWD, New
York, N. Y.: Mentor Book, 1964.
(ed.), VARIETIES OF MODERNI SOCIAL
THEORY, New York, N. Y.: E. P. Dutton, 1963:
109
Robert K. Merton, "Social Structure and Anomie," pp.364-
401.
Edwin M. Schur, RADICAL NON-INTERVENTION, Englewood Cliffs,
N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973.
Melvin Seeman, "On the Meaning of Alienation," AMERICAN
SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW, Volume 24, 1959, pp.783-791.
Benson Snyder, THE HIDDEN CURRICULUM, New York, N. Y.: Knopf,
1970.
Robert Sommer, DESIGN AWARENESS, Corte MIadera, Calif.:
Rinehart Press, 1972.
William A. Southworth, "A Study of the Psychological Uses
of Particular Physical Settings," unpublished manuscript,
1970.
William I. Thompson, AT THE EDGE OF HISTORY, New York, N. Y.:
Harper Colophon Books, 1971.
John F. C. Turner and R. Fichter (eds.), FREEDON TO BUILD,
New York, N. Y.: Macmillan, 1972:
R. Fichter, et al., "The Meaning of Autonomy," pp.241-
254.
Hans H. Harms, "User and Community Involvement in
Housing and its Effects on Professionalism," pp.176-198.
J. F. C. Turner, "The Reeducation of a Professional,"
pp.122-147.
Alexander Tzonis, TOWARDS A NON-OPPRESSIVE ENVIROIMNT,
New York, N. Y.: George Braziller, 1972.
John Zeisel, "Social Research and Architectural Planning,"
unpublished manuscript, 1971.
